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I. Introduction
Guns have been a major part of Bill Johnson’s life ever since
his grandfather taught him how to shoot as a child.1 Bill Johnson
was nine years old when he first learned how to shoot a gun.2 At
fourteen, his grandfather gave him his first shotgun.3 Three years
later, the Marine Corps issued him a rifle.4 And for the past decade,
Bill has carried a permitted concealed weapon.5 Now, as a

1. See Sheryl G. Stolberg, Gun Rights and Foster Care Restrictions Collide
in Michigan, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 8, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/08/08/us/
michigan-gun-foster-care.html?mcubz=3 (last visited Sept. 24, 2018) (discussing
Bill Johnson’s history of firearm use) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
2. See id. (noting Bill Johnson’s history with firearms).
3. See id. (“‘It’s a tradition,’ [Johnson] said. ‘My grandfather taught me, and
my grandfather’s grandfather taught him.’”).
4. See id. (addressing Bill Johnson’s experience joining the military).
5. See id. (noting that Bill Johnson has a concealed carry permit issued by
the state of Michigan).
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grandfather himself, Bill’s ability to carry his gun and use it in
self-defense may be in jeopardy.6
In 2017, the Michigan Department of Health and Human
Services (MDHHS) asked Bill Johnson and his wife, Jill, to become
foster parents to their grandson.7 However, they allege, MDHHS
told them “if you want to care for your grandson you will have to
give up some of your constitutional rights.”8 Specifically, to comply
with the MDHHS firearm restrictions, the Johnsons would have to
give up their Second Amendment right to possess a
“readily-available firearm[] for self-defense and defense of family.”9
In Illinois, Kenneth and Colleen Shults have been foster
parents for over a decade.10 They currently have a foster child in
their home, along with their three biological children.11 Kenneth
has a long history with firearms and is an “instructor at a youth
firearms safety camp . . . focusing on safely handling and using
weapons for all manner of shooting sports.”12 Colleen works for the
Illinois Department of Corrections (IDOC) as a nurse at Danville
Correctional Center.13 In March of 2016, the IDOC sent Colleen a
letter warning her that prisoners were using a people-locator to
discover the addresses of IDOC staff, including nurses.14 The letter
warned Colleen to “be careful and diligent for [her] safety.”15
Unfortunately, as foster parents Kenneth and Colleen are
prohibited from keeping a loaded, functional firearm in their
home.16 They claim that they would “possess loaded and functional
6. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 8, Johnson v.
Lyon, No. 2:17-cv-00124 (W.D. Mich. July 17, 2017) (claiming that the MDHHS
regulations on foster parents will impair Bill and Linda Johnson’s Second
Amendment rights).
7. See id. at 4 (“The Johnsons were asked by the State of Michigan to be
foster parents to their grandchild.”).
8. Id.
9. Id. at 8.
10. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 3, Shults v.
Sheldon, No. 2:16-cv-02214 (C.D. Ill. July 12, 2016) (discussing the Shults’ current
fostering of a child they are in the process of adopting).
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. See id. (laying out the background of the plaintiff Colleen Shults).
14. See id. at 4 (describing the warning Colleen Shults received).
15. Id.
16. Id.; see also ILL. DEP’T OF CHILDREN & FAMILY SERVS., POL’Y GUIDE
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firearms for self-defense” if not for the fear that they would lose
their ability to foster children.17
Michigan and Illinois—like all states except one—directly
regulate the way foster parents store and handle firearms in their
home.18 A vast majority place a burden on foster parents’ ability to
access a functional firearm for the purpose of defending themselves
in their home by requiring firearms to be stored in locked areas.19
The regulations in question are directed specifically at foster
parents or the foster home and do not mirror the state’s general
regulations on firearms.20 Only one state, Massachusetts, has a
generally applicable law that makes it unlawful to store a firearm
unless that firearm is secured by a lock or in a locked container.21
However, the statute allows the owner to carry a firearm on his
person by explicitly declaring that action as outside of the
2015.08, ENHANCED FIREARM SAFETY IN FOSTER FAMILY HOMES (2015) (requiring
foster parents in Illinois to store firearms in a locked safe, disabled by a trigger
lock, with ammunition stored in a separate, locked location). The policy guide
cited in the complaint is no longer available on the department website. It is
unclear whether they intended to do away with the policy by removing the guide.
However, Illinois still requires that foster parents keep all firearms unloaded and
locked up in a place inaccessible to children. ILL. ADMIN. CODE tit. 89, § 402.8
(2018).
17. See Complaint for Declaratory and Injunctive Relief at 4, Shults v.
Sheldon, No. 2:16-cv-02214 (C.D. Ill. July 12, 2016) (stating that the Shults’ do
not possess a functional firearm in their home because they fear the state will
take away their foster children).
18. See infra Figure 1 (showing that Pennsylvania is the only state without
a regulation or policy specifically addressing firearms in foster homes).
19. See infra notes 33–35 and accompanying text (illustrating the number of
states that require locked storage for firearms and separated ammunition); see
also District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 630 (2008) (determining that a
trigger lock requirement rendered firearms inoperable in the home for
self-defense, making it unconstitutional).
20. Compare MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 400.9415(3) (2018) (placing restrictions
on foster homes), with MICH. DEP’T OF ST. POLICE, MSP-203, USE AND STORAGE OF
A FIREARM IN A HOME ENVIRONMENT 2, https://www.michigan.gov/documents/
msp/msp-203_-_PDF_286476_7.pdf (recommending that firearms be safely stored
in the home but not requiring it).
21. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 140, § 131l (2018) (criminalizing storage of
firearms without securing them in a locked location or with a locking device); see
also Safe Storage, GIFFORDS LAW CTR., http://lawcenter.giffords.org/gunlaws/policy-areas/child-consumer-safety/safe-storage/#state (last visited Sept. 24,
2018) (“Massachusetts is the only state that generally requires that all firearms
be stored with a lock in place.”) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
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definition of stored.22 There are some municipalities with similar
requirements for locked storage, but each has an exception for
firearms in the person’s control or possession.23 Only South
Carolina explicitly allows for foster parents to carry a firearm on
their person instead of keeping it in locked storage.24 Another three
states have generally applicable storage requirements for
individuals who reside with others who are not lawfully allowed to
possess firearms, but still allow the firearm to be kept in the
owner’s possession.25 Finally, many states impose criminal
penalties on people who negligently or recklessly store a firearm
where a child could gain access to it.26 However, none of these
states impose these child access laws in a way that requires
specific storage standards, allowing for sensible storage of operable
firearms to use in self-defense.27
22. See MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 140, § 131l (2018) (“[S]uch weapon shall not be
deemed stored or kept if carried by or under the control of the owner or other
lawfully authorized user.”).
23. See, e.g., N.Y.C., N.Y., ADMIN. CODE § 10-312 (2018) (requiring firearms
to be rendered inoperable with a safety locking device when not in the possession
or control of the owner); OAKLAND, CAL. MUN. CODE § 9.39.040 (2018) (“Except
when carried on his or her person, no person shall keep a firearm . . . in any
residence unless the firearm is stored in a locked container, or . . . disabled with
a trigger lock . . . .”).
24. See S.C. CODE ANN. REGS. 114-550(H)(18) (2018) (“Firearms and any
ammunition shall be kept in a locked storage container except when being legally
carried upon the foster parent’s person; being used for educational, recreational,
or defense of self or property purposes by the foster parent; or being cleaned by
the foster parent.”); see also infra Figure 1 (compiling all of the state regulations
and noting only one with an explicit exception for lawful uses of the firearm).
25. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.45 (McKinney 2018) (“No person who
owns . . . [a] firearm who resides with an individual who . . . is prohibited from
possessing a firearm . . . shall store or otherwise leave such . . . firearm out of his
or her immediate possession . . . without having first securely locked such rifle,
shotgun or firearm . . . .”); CAL. PENAL CODE § 25135 (West 2018) (requiring
persons who own or reside in a residence with a person prohibited from owning,
possessing, or receiving a firearm to keep any firearms in the residence in locked
storage or on their person); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 29-37i (2018) (imposing similar
restrictions on firearm storage in a residence with a prohibited person, but only
for loaded firearms).
26. See Child Access Prevention, GIFFORDS LAW CTR., http://lawcenter.
giffords.org/gun-laws/policy-areas/child-consumer-safety/child-access-prevention
/#state (last visited Sept. 24, 2018) (describing all of the state laws related to
prevention of child access to firearms) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
27. See id. (noting that the only state with a storage requirement is
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This Note does not address the constitutionality of these other
regulations. These examples simply show that the burden states
place on their general population is not nearly as excessive as the
burden the regulations in question place on foster parents.28 Foster
parents have been singled out as a group, and the regulations
inhibit their ability to use their firearms in self-defense.29 This
Note attempts to resolve whether regulations requiring the storage
of firearms in locked containers and the locking of ammunition in
a separate location in all foster homes violates foster parents’
Second Amendment right to “keep and bear arms,”30 as defined in
District of Columbia v. Heller.31
To address this issue, Part II lays out the extent of the
constitutional question by determining how many states regulate
firearm storage in foster homes. Because a current compilation
that describes these restrictions does not exist, this Note provides
a survey of the state’s regulations to determine how many states
may be affected by the answer to this question.32 Then, Part II
presents the Michigan regulations as a case study representing the
way a majority of states have chosen to regulate firearms in foster
homes. Part III discusses the current status of the Second
Massachusetts, whose storage law is generally applicable rather than confined to
child access).
28. Compare MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 140, § 131l (2018) (requiring people to
store firearms in a locked location or with a trigger lock when not carried on the
person), with MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 400.9415(3) (2018) (requiring firearms be kept
in locked storage or trigger locked, with ammunition locked in separate storage
at all times in the home).
29. See MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 400.9415(3) (2018) (placing restrictions on
foster homes); see also District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 630 (2008)
(determining that requirements that render firearms inoperable for the purpose
of self-defense in the home conflict with the Second Amendment).
30. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
31. 554 U.S. 570 (2008). In Heller, the Supreme Court’s task was to
determine the constitutionality of District of Columbia ordinances that resulted
in a ban on handguns and a requirement that all other guns in the home be
disabled with trigger locks or disassembled at all times. Id. at 574–75. The
Supreme Court concluded that the Second Amendment conferred an individual
right of the people to possess a firearm to use for lawful purposes, including
self-defense in the home. Id. at 595, 635. Based on this interpretation, the
Supreme Court held that both the handgun ban and trigger lock requirement
violated the Second Amendment. Id. at 635.
32. See infra Figure 1 (compiling each state’s regulations or policies
regarding firearms in foster homes).
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Amendment following the most recent Supreme Court decisions
and states why the regulations at issue burden the Second
Amendment right. Part IV analyzes the Supreme Court decisions
further, as well as subsequent circuit court cases, to develop a test
for determining the constitutionality of laws that impose a burden
on the Second Amendment. Part V then applies that test to the
storage requirements for foster homes and ultimately argues that
requiring storage of firearms in a locked safe or cabinet is an
unconstitutional burden on the rights of foster parents.
II. State Regulation of Foster Parents’ Firearm Storage
The current litigation in Illinois and Michigan could affect a
substantial number of states.33 Forty-nine states and the District
of Columbia (D.C.) have regulations specifically addressing
firearms in foster homes.34 Forty-four states and D.C. require
foster parents to store firearms in the home in locked cabinets or
disable firearms with a trigger lock.35 Thirty-seven of those states
and D.C. additionally require that ammunition is stored away from
the firearms, with thirty states and D.C. requiring foster parents
to lock the ammunition storage location.36 Finally, five states
require disabling of firearms by a trigger lock in addition to
keeping that firearm in locked storage.37
33. See supra Part I (discussing the litigation taking place in Illinois and
Michigan).
34. See infra Figure 1 (compiling the regulations of each state and D.C. and
showing that all but Pennsylvania have specific regulations for firearms in foster
homes).
35. See, e.g., 016.15.2 ARK. CODE R. § 208 (LexisNexis 2018) (“All firearms
shall be maintained in a secure, locked location or secured by a trigger lock.”); see
also infra Figure 1 (recognizing each state that requires firearms be kept in some
kind of locked storage or disabled from use, and citing the regulation in which
this restriction is contained).
36. See, e.g., FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 65G-2.007(12)(c) (2018) (“All firearms
must be stored unloaded. Firearms and ammunition shall be stored separately
from each other within locked storage areas.”); see also infra Figure 1 (recognizing
each state which requires that ammunition be stored separately from the
firearms).
37. See, e.g., ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R21-8-106 (2018) (“Firearms are unloaded,
trigger locked, and kept in a tamper-proof, locked storage container made of
unbreakable material; and . . . [a]mmunition is maintained in locked storage that
is separate from firearms.”); see also infra Figure 1 (marking the four states which
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It is not possible to focus on each of these states, so this Note
looks in-depth at a single state that represents these common
restrictions.38 The Michigan regulations currently being
challenged under the Second Amendment39 are representative of
the more common restrictions used throughout the different
states.40 Therefore, this Note focuses on the Michigan regulations
in its analysis but, due to the similarities with other regulations,
comes to a more generally applicable conclusion.41
In 2001, the Michigan Department of Health and Human
Services (MDHHS) amended the rules listed in the Licensing Rules
for Foster Family Homes and Foster Family Group Homes for
Children.42 In the amendments, MDHHS created specific
restrictions relating to the storage of firearms in foster homes.43
The firearms must be “[s]tored in a locked metal or solid wood gun
safe”44 or “[t]rigger-locked and stored without ammunition in a
locked area.”45 Ammunition must be “stored in a separate locked
location.”46 Handguns must also be registered, with the
registration documents available for review.47
require firearms be disabled by a trigger lock while in locked storage).
38. See infra Figure 1 (showing the most common restrictions placed on the
storage of firearms in foster homes).
39. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (describing the claim brought
by the Johnson family in Michigan).
40. See MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 400.9415(3) (2018) (requiring firearms be kept
in locked storage or trigger locked, with ammunition locked in separate storage);
infra Figure 1 (compiling regulations of which a majority require locked storage
of firearms with the ammunition stored in a separate, locked container).
41. See infra Figure 1 (illustrating that most of the states regulate through
two common requirements).
42. See generally MICH. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., LICENSING RULES
FOR FOSTER FAMILY HOMES AND FOSTER FAMILY GROUP HOMES FOR CHILDREN
(2015),
https://www.michigan.gov/documents/mdhhs/CWL-PUB10_502652_7.pdf; see also Brief of Amicus Curiae Everytown for Gun Safety in
Support of Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss or for Summary Judgment at 3,
Johnson v. Lyon, No. 2:17-cv-00124 (W.D. Mich. Oct 6, 2017) [hereinafter
Everytown Brief] (stating that MDHHS promulgated the firearm storage
regulation at issue in 2001).
43. See MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 400.9415(3) (2018) (listing specific
requirements relating to firearms in foster homes).
44. Id. r. 400.9415(3)(a).
45. Id. r. 400.9415(3)(b).
46. Id. r. 400.9415(3)(c).
47. See id. r. 400.9415(3)(d) (requiring registration documents be available
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MDHHS had a significant interest it was trying to achieve
when enacting these regulations. There is no collection of data
describing the dangers of guns in foster homes specifically.
However, Everytown for Gun Safety (Everytown), writing in
support of a Motion to Dismiss filed by MDHHS, addressed the
important interest in regulations such as those in Michigan by
presenting statistics related to children and firearms in general.48
In 2015, 565 children used a gun to commit suicide, the highest
number since 1999.49 Suicide attempts involving guns are fatal
90% of the time, resulting in guns accounting for 40% of adolescent
suicides.50 This is significant when compared to the most common
method of attempted suicide—overdose—which is fatal in 2% of
attempts.51 The effectiveness of firearms over other methods of
suicide is especially important because 90% of people who attempt
suicide and survive will not attempt to commit suicide again.52
This is important for gun storage laws because over 80% of child
suicides by gun use a firearm from their own home.53 This suggests
that even if youths still attempt suicide by another method because
they lack access to a firearm, they will be less likely to succeed, and
unlikely to try again.
Firearms also pose a danger to children through both
intentional and unintentional shootings.54 Prior to the 2001
enactment of the MDHHS regulation, 22,661 children fourteen
years old or younger suffered nonfatal injuries from firearms
for inspection). The constitutionality of this requirement will not be analyzed in
this Note.
48. See Everytown Brief, supra note 42, at 3–9 (laying out statistics to show
the danger that firearms pose to children).
49. See id. at 7 (“In 2015, 565 children and adolescents died by firearm
suicide—the highest number . . . going back to 1999.”).
50. See id. (discussing the statistics about the use of guns in youth suicides).
51. See Matthew Miller et al., Suicide Mortality in the United States: The
Importance of Attending to Method in Understanding Population-Level
Disparities in the Burden of Suicide, 33 AM. REV. OF PUB. HEALTH 393, 397 (2012)
(discussing the rates of successful suicide versus unsuccessful attempts based on
method).
52. See Everytown Brief, supra note 42, at 6 (“Ninety percent of people who
survive a suicide attempt will not die as a result of suicide . . . .”).
53. See id. at 7 (“[O]ver 80% of children who die by firearm suicide used a
gun from their own home.”).
54. See id. at 3 (discussing statistics relating to child victims of shootings).
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between 1993 and 2000.55 Over 9,700 of those, or 43.1%, resulted
from unintentional shootings.56 During that time, 5,542 children
were killed by guns, with 1,146 of them resulting from
unintentional shootings.57 This trend continues. In 2014,
government statistics showed that sixty-nine children aged
fourteen or younger were killed as a result of an unintentional
discharge of a gun.58 Everytown states that an independent review
concluded that at least 100 children were killed in unintentional
shootings in 2013.59
A study published in 2005 suggests that regulations such as
those required by MDHHS reduce the risk of both suicides and
unintentional injuries among adolescents and children younger
than twenty.60 The study, which looked at children who
intentionally
or
unintentionally
shot
themselves
or
unintentionally shot another person, revealed that “practices of
keeping the reference firearm unloaded, locked, and the
ammunition locked were all associated with significantly
decreased risks of a shooting event.”61 In Michigan specifically,
Everytown’s own study found forty-six cases of unintentional
shootings committed by children under eighteen between the start
of 2015 until the writing of the brief in October of 2017.62
Everytown’s analysis concluded that forty-four of these could have
been prevented by restrictions like those in the MDHHS

55. See id. (noting the number of “nonfatal firearms injuries” suffered by
“children aged fourteen or younger”).
56. See id. (stating that 9,775 children suffered nonfatal injuries as the
result of an unintentional shooting).
57. See id. (providing the statistics of child deaths by shooting in the United
States between 1993 and 2000).
58. Id. at 4.
59. See id. (discussing a review conducted by Everytown that contradicted
the data reported by the government relating to children killed in unintentional
shootings).
60. See David C. Grossman et al., Gun Storage Practices and Risk of Youth
Suicide and Unintentional Firearm Injuries, 293 JAMA 707, 708 (2005)
(describing the method used to study the effects of gun storage on youth suicide
and unintentional firearm injury rates).
61. Id. at 711.
62. See Everytown Brief, supra note 42, at 5 (discussing their own database
tracking publicly reported shootings unintentionally committed by children aged
seventeen and younger).
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regulations.63 These numbers reflect both a local concern for
Michigan and a national concern that would likely interest each
state that regulates in a similar fashion.
III. The Conflict Between State Regulations and the Second
Amendment
The numbers above do not specifically reflect the impact on
foster homes, and the data on whether foster children are at a
higher risk of suicide in America is shaky at best.64 Also, looking
at past injuries does not guarantee that restrictions could have
prevented them. However, the numbers show that a problem exists
with child injuries and death from firearms. In 2017, a child died
every week on average from an accidental shooting.65 Additionally,
Michigan has an increased interest in safety for foster children
because they remain the responsibility of the state despite living
in a private foster home.66 Nonetheless, having an interest in the
safety of children does not necessarily allow the state to burden the
rights of foster parents.67 The potential infringement of a
constitutional right may outweigh the state’s interest, so an
analysis of the Second Amendment right is required before the
validity of the regulations can be assessed.68
63. See id. (stating that 96% of the shootings could have been prevented by
safe storage laws).
64. See infra notes 425–426 and accompanying text (discussing the issues
with studies claiming higher suicide rates among foster children versus children
in traditional homes).
65. See Nick Penzenstadler et al., Added Agony: Justice is Haphazard After
Kids’
Gun
Deaths,
USA TODAY (May
24,
2017,
3:04
AM),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2017/05/24/justice-haphazard-when-kidsdie-in-gun-accidents/101568654/ (last visited Sept. 24, 2018) (“Children under age
12 die from gun accidents in the United States about once a week, on average.”)
(on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
66. See MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 400.10(1)(c) (2018) (defining “foster care” as
“24-hour substitute care for children placed away from their parents or guardians
and for whom the state agency has placement and care responsibility” (emphasis
added)).
67. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 636 (2008) (noting that
the existence of a constitutional right precludes consideration of certain options
for combatting a problem).
68. See infra Parts III–IV (determining the proper test for whether the
state’s interest may overcome the protection of the Second Amendment).
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A. District of Columbia v. Heller

Prior to 2008, the Supreme Court had never invalidated a
regulation under the Second Amendment.69 In fact, the Supreme
Court had not interpreted the Second Amendment since 1939,
when the Court, in United States v. Miller,70 upheld a federal ban
on transporting shotguns with shortened barrels in interstate
commerce.71 In District of Columbia v. Heller, the Court did not
overturn Miller, but it limited the prior decision to the specific
restriction on short-barreled shotguns.72 The Court determined
that Miller had not interpreted the meaning of the Second
Amendment, thereby making Heller the main precedent.73
Heller addressed two heavily debated issues regarding the
Second Amendment that are relevant to the current inquiry.74
First, the Court had to determine who the Second Amendment
applied to.75 Prior to Heller, much of the debate over the meaning
of the Amendment questioned whether the right to bear arms
existed as an individual right unrelated to service in the militia.76
The majority in Heller concluded that the Second Amendment’s
invocation of a “right of the people” conveyed an individual right to
each person, not a collective right attached to membership in a
69. See Robert J. Spitzer, Gun Law, Policy, and Politics, 84 N.Y. ST. B.J.,
July–Aug. 2012, at 35, 37 (“[F]or the first time in history, a federal court
overturned a gun regulation as a violation of the Second Amendment.”).
70. 307 U.S. 174 (1939).
71. See id. at 178 (“[W]e cannot say that the Second Amendment guarantees
the right to keep and bear such an instrument.”).
72. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 622 (“Beyond [the type of weapon at issue], the
opinion provided no explanation of the content of the right.”).
73. Id.; see also Spitzer, supra note 69, at 37 (“The decision did not overturn
United States v. Miller . . . .”).
74. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 577 (“Petitioners . . . believe that [the Second
Amendment] protects only the right to possess . . . a firearm in connection with
militia service. Respondent argues that it protects an individual right to possess
a firearm unconnected with service in a militia, and to use that arm
for . . . self-defense within the home.” (internal citations omitted)).
75. See id. (describing the debate over whether the Second Amendment
established an individual right).
76. See Joseph Blocher, Categoricalism and Balancing in First and Second
Amendment Analysis, 84 N.Y.U. L. REV. 375, 399 (2009) (claiming that the debate
about the Second Amendment pre-Heller focused almost exclusively on the
question of whether the right was an “individual” right).
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militia.77 Second, the Court needed to determine the purpose
behind the Second Amendment right to bear arms.78 The majority
extensively analyzed the text and history of the Second
Amendment to try to determine its purpose.79 The Court reasoned
that the preservation of the militia was a plausible purpose for
codifying the right.80 However, the court divided the Amendment
into two distinct clauses, the prefatory and operative clauses.81 The
majority did not interpret the prefatory clause language about the
necessity of an armed militia as limiting the Amendment to the
sole purpose of participation in the militia.82 The Court also
identified self-defense as a primary purpose of the Second
Amendment.83
B. McDonald v. City of Chicago
Because Heller addressed a law within a federal territory, the
Court did not address the issue of whether the Second Amendment
applies to the states.84 This question did not take long to come
before the Court and was answered affirmatively two years later.85
77. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 595 (“There seems to us no doubt, on the basis of
both text and history, that the Second Amendment conferred an individual right
to keep and bear arms.”).
78. See id. at 581–91 (analyzing the substance of the right to determine the
reason for its protection).
79. See id. at 599–600 (discussing the purpose of the Amendment and
whether the prefatory clause limits it).
80. See id. at 599 (“It is therefore entirely sensible that the Second
Amendment’s prefatory clause announces the purpose for which the right was
codified: to prevent elimination of the militia.”).
81. See id. at 577 (splitting the Amendment into a prefatory clause, stating
a purpose of the right, and an operative clause, establishing the right that is not
limited by the prefatory clause).
82. See id. at 599 (“The prefatory clause does not suggest that preserving the
militia was the only reason Americans valued the ancient right . . . .”).
83. See id. at 630 (determining that the District’s restrictions stopped
citizens from using firearms for “the core lawful purpose of self-defense”).
84. See Allen Rostron, Justice Breyer’s Triumph in the Third Battle Over the
Second Amendment, 80 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 703, 722 (2012) (discussing Heller’s
focus on laws within the District of Columbia, a federal territory, leaving
incorporation through the Fourteenth Amendment outside of the issues before the
Court).
85. See id. at 722 (stating that a challenge to Chicago’s handgun ban was
filed within fifteen minutes of the Heller decision’s announcement, which
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In McDonald v. City of Chicago,86 the Court held that the Second
Amendment was incorporated to the states through the
Fourteenth Amendment.87 Also, the Court decided that the right of
the people to possess firearms for the purpose of self-defense in the
home, as established in Heller, applies equally when incorporated
through the Fourteenth Amendment.88 Consequently, state
regulations will be held to the same standard as federal
regulations when they touch on the fundamental right to bear
arms.89 This is important for the central analysis of this Note
because the regulations in question were all passed at the state
level,90 and because the regulations mainly burden the ability of
foster parents to use their firearms for self-defense.91 However, the
Court did not make it clear how future courts should assess the
validity of regulations that are potentially in conflict with the
Second Amendment.92 The Court simply relied on the holding in
Heller to invalidate the restriction once it determined that the
Second Amendment applied to the states.93

eventually found its way before the Supreme Court in McDonald).
86. 561 U.S. 742 (2010). McDonald involved a challenge to Chicago laws that
amounted to a ban on handguns within the city. See id. at 750. The city municipal
code required all handguns be registered, and also prohibited the registration of
most handguns. Id. Petitioners challenged the ban under the Second and
Fourteenth Amendments. Id. at 752. The Court spent very little time on the
question of the ban’s constitutionality. See id. at 791. The majority of the Court’s
focus was on whether the Second Amendment is incorporated to the state’s under
the Fourteenth Amendment. See id. at 767–91.
87. See id. at 791 (“[T]he Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
incorporates the Second Amendment right recognized in Heller.”).
88. See id. at 787–88 (rejecting the dissent’s assertion that the Fourteenth
Amendment stands on its own and requiring that the States be governed by a
“single, neutral principle”).
89. See id. at 791 (determining that the Second Amendment “applies equally
to the Federal Government and the States”).
90. See infra Figure 1 (citing each of the state regulations that may be at
issue with the Second Amendment).
91. See supra note 9 and accompanying text (noting the Johnson’s
allegations that their Second Amendment rights are severely burdened by the
Michigan regulations).
92. See Rostron, supra note 84, at 724 (“[T]he Court shed no new light on
exactly how judges should go about sorting valid gun laws from invalid ones.”).
93. See McDonald, 561 U.S. at 791 (striking down the handgun ban based
on the holding of Heller).
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C. The Conflict Between Heller, McDonald, and the
Michigan Regulation
Michigan—like forty-three other states and the District of
Columbia94—requires that firearms in the home be stored with a
trigger lock or in a locked container.95 These regulations alone
seem to neglect the Court’s ruling in Heller, in which the Court
determined that requiring firearms to be trigger locked or
rendered inoperable was an unconstitutional burden on the right
to use firearms for self-defense.96 Regulations requiring trigger
locks directly violate this ruling, and requiring the placement of
firearms in a locked safe or container seems to place the same
burden on accessing them for self-defense.97 On top of this,
Michigan and thirty-six other states require that ammunition be
kept separately, with thirty-one requiring ammunition be kept in
a separate locked container.98 Some states even require that the
separate containers have different keys.99 Finally, a couple states
add a trigger lock requirement on top of the separate locked
storage requirements.100
Each of these regulations creates an added restriction on the
ability of a foster parent to access their firearms in the case that
they need to use them for the purpose of self-defense. However,

94. See supra note 35 and accompanying text (noting the number of states
that require firearms to be kept in locked storage).
95. See, e.g., MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 400.9415(3) (2018) (requiring that
firearms either be kept in locked storage or equipped with a trigger lock).
96. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 630 (2008) (concluding
that a trigger lock requirement is unconstitutional under the Second
Amendment).
97. See id. at 635 (determining that a restriction which renders a firearm
inoperable for the purpose of self-defense is unconstitutional).
98. See supra note 36 and accompanying text (discussing the widespread
requirement that ammunition be stored separately); MICH. ADMIN. CODE r.
400.9415(3) (2018) (requiring that foster parents store ammunition in a separate,
locked container from any firearms).
99. See, e.g., UTAH ADMIN. CODE r. 501-12-7(6)(c)(i) (2018) (“The locked
storage for firearms and ammunition shall not be accessible through the same
keys or combinations.”).
100. See, e.g., ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE § R21-8-106(A)(2)(a) (2018) (“Firearms are
unloaded, trigger locked, and kept in a tamper-proof, locked storage
container . . . .”).
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Heller dealt with a generally applicable regulation.101 The
regulations in question apply to a single class of people—foster
parents102—which could potentially take them out of the protection
of the Second Amendment.103 This question is addressed below.104
Also, the state has an added interest in the protection of youth in
foster care because they remain the responsibility of the state
despite living in a private residence.105 Part V addresses these
issues to determine if the regulations can be reconciled with
Heller’s interpretation of the Second Amendment.
IV. The Current Standard for Analyzing Second Amendment
Restrictions
Now that the issue is defined, it is necessary to determine the
proper way to resolve the problem. To do so, this Part analyzes the
Supreme Court and circuit courts’ Second Amendment decisions.106
A. The Lack of Guidance in Heller and McDonald
With its recent decisions, the Supreme Court created more
questions than it answered. Heller made clear that the Court
intended “law-abiding, responsible citizens” to be within the
protected sphere of the Second Amendment, and that right applies
to the purpose of self-defense in the home.107 However, the Court
101. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 573 (describing the District of Columbia statute
generally prohibiting the registration of handguns and requiring all residents
keep their firearms rendered inoperable in the home).
102. See, e.g., MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 400.9415(3) (2018) (regulating firearm
storage in foster homes specifically).
103. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27 (discussing the possibility of allowing for
restrictions on firearms relating to certain classes of people).
104. See infra Part V.A (determining whether foster parents can be excluded
under the Second Amendment).
105. See MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 400.10(1)(c) (2018) (defining foster care as
“substitute care” of children for whom the state has “placement and care
responsibility”).
106. See infra Part IV.A–B (discussing the categorical and balancing
approaches, and then discussing the approach used by the circuit courts).
107. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008) (concluding
that the Second Amendment “surely elevates above all other interests the right
of law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home”).
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left room for certain longstanding restrictions to be presumed
constitutional.108 The Court gave a non-exhaustive list of examples
that would fall within that presumption.109 The examples can be
sorted into five potential categories that may be restricted without
offending the Second Amendment.110 These include: (1) possession
by certain classes of people, such as felons;111 (2) possession in
certain places, such as government buildings;112 (3) imposition of
restrictions on the sale of firearms;113 (4) possession of certain
types of firearms;114 and (5) storage of firearms for the prevention
of accidents.115 Rather than expounding on what might fit into
these categories, the Court left the exact interpretation of these
permissible restrictions to future decisions as they come before the
Court.116
Also, the Court rejected rational basis review.117 The Court
asserted that rational basis is the general standard set forth by the
108. See id. at 626 (noting that the opinion should not “cast doubt” on certain
prohibitions that had been in existence long before the opinion).
109. See id. at 626–27 (mentioning restrictions on possession by felons and
the mentally ill, possession on school or government property, and conditions on
sales); id. at 627 n.26 (“[O]ur list does not purport to be exhaustive.”).
110. See id. at 626–27 (giving examples of potentially valid restrictions).
111. See id. (“[N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt on
longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons and the
mentally ill . . . .”).
112. See id. (“[N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt
on . . . laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive places . . . .”).
113. See id. (“[N]othing in our opinion should be taken to cast doubt
on . . . laws imposing conditions and qualifications on the commercial sale of
arms.”).
114. See id. at 627 (“[T]he sorts of weapons protected were those ‘in common
use at the time.’”).
115. See id. at 632 (“Nor, correspondingly, does our analysis suggest the
invalidity of laws regulating the storage of firearms to prevent accidents.”).
116. See id. at 635 (responding to the dissent’s argument that the majority
left so many applications in doubt without justification by stating the Court will
expound upon those issues “if and when those exceptions come before us”); see
also Blocher, supra note 76, at 433 (“But Heller failed to identify its underlying
values, making it difficult for future courts to recognize any lineal descendants of
the original categories ascertained by the Court in Heller.”).
117. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 628 n.27 (2008)
(rejecting rational basis review as the proper standard of analysis). Under
rational basis review, a state action does not violate the Fourteenth Amendment’s
Equal Protection Clause if it “rationally furthers the purpose identified by the
State.” Mass. Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 314 (1976).
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Constitution to protect the people from “irrational laws.”118 It
would be redundant to enumerate a right which is given the same
standard of review that all laws must pass under the
Constitution.119 This would give the enumeration of the right “no
effect” because the laws against it would be subject to the same
test if the right were not enumerated.120 Therefore, the Second
Amendment’s existence implies that it deserves a higher standard
of review.121 However, the Court failed to define the proper level of
scrutiny that the Second Amendment should be afforded.122
Some experts suggest that the Court hoped to pull the Second
Amendment out of the normal scrutiny analysis.123 This conclusion
is supported by the Court’s refusal to choose a level of scrutiny to
apply to the analysis.124 Justice Scalia’s majority opinion rejected
Justice Breyer’s attempt to establish an interest-balancing
approach that does not specifically propose any of the traditional
levels of scrutiny.125 Scalia wrote that he “[knew] of no other
enumerated constitutional right whose core protection has been
subjected to a freestanding ‘interest-balancing’ approach.”126 While
this statement was not in response to the proposal of a traditional
scrutiny analysis, each level of scrutiny applies its own test that
118. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 628 n.27 (“[R]ational-basis scrutiny is a mode of
analysis we have used when evaluating laws under constitutional commands that
are themselves prohibitions on irrational laws.”).
119. See id. (“If all that was required to overcome the right to keep and bear
arms was a rational basis, the Second Amendment would be redundant with the
separate constitutional prohibitions on irrational laws.”).
120. See id. (stating that rational basis would give the Second Amendment
“no effect”).
121. See id. (stating that the use of rational basis review would mean that the
Second Amendment has no effect).
122. See Rostron, supra note 84, at 716 (addressing the failure of the Court to
provide a proper standard for analyzing the Second Amendment).
123. See id. (discussing Chief Justice Roberts’ questioning of the need to apply
the conventional tiers of analysis to the Second Amendment); Blocher, supra note
76, at 405 (noting that the Heller majority used an approach that was categorical
in nature).
124. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 634 (noting that the dissent criticizes the majority
for failing to establish a proper level of scrutiny to apply to regulations that
implicate the Second Amendment).
125. See id. at 634–35 (justifying the majority’s refusal to adopt an
interest-balancing approach in their analysis in response to the dissent’s
criticism).
126. Id. at 634.
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pins the interests of the right against the purpose behind the
regulation.127
The Court justified its denial of the interest-balancing
approach with the argument that longstanding regulations—those
restrictions on firearms in place when the Second Amendment was
ratified—were the product of interest-balancing by the Founders
who wrote the Amendment.128 The balancing has already been
done, and it is not the job of future legislatures and courts to redo
it based on their own personal interests.129 This reasoning supports
a pure category-based approach—only withholding Second
Amendment protection from the categories that were determined
to be justified at the time of solidifying the right in the
Constitution.130 A scrutiny approach would still allow for a
revisiting of those interests later, just with a pre-established
threshold that must be met to justify a regulation. Either way, the
Court felt that the question was meaningless in Heller because the
restrictions in question were unconstitutional under any possible
scrutiny analysis.131 Because of this, Heller did not establish a
proper test to employ in the future, and left room for further
analysis.
Additionally, during oral arguments in Heller, Chief Justice
Roberts specifically questioned the need to subject the regulations
at hand to a standard of review.132 Specifically, he stated that
127. See 16B AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 857 (2009) (describing the
different levels of scrutiny applied in cases involving potential violations of equal
protection or fundamental rights). Each standard of scrutiny involves some level
of weighing the government’s interest in the law versus a standard set by the
court. See id. This test is seemingly its own form of balancing the government’s
interest against the interest in the fundamental right.
128. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008) (“Like the
First, [the Second Amendment] is the very product of an interest balancing by the
people.”).
129. See id. at 634–35 (“Constitutional rights are enshrined with the scope
they were understood to have when the people adopted them, whether or not
future legislatures or (yes) even future judges think that scope too broad.”).
130. See id. at 626–27 (giving examples of potentially valid restrictions based
on their status as “longstanding prohibitions”).
131. See id. at 628 (stating that the restrictions would not survive “[u]nder
any of the standards of scrutiny that we have applied to enumerated
constitutional rights”).
132. See Rostron, supra note 84, at 716 (noting that Chief Justice Roberts’
questioning at oral arguments in Heller explains the failure to identify a test).
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“these various phrases under the different standards that are
proposed, ‘compelling interest,’ ‘significant interest,’ ‘narrowly
tailored,’ none of them appear in the Constitution; and [he]
wonder[s] why in this case [the Court] ha[s] to articulate an
all-encompassing standard.”133 This, in itself, is not dispositive of
a desire to completely abandon any scrutiny analysis, because it
referred only to establishing an “all-encompassing standard” in an
analysis of a single regulation and not to establishing a standard
in any Second Amendment review.134 The Chief Justice’s
statement left room for adoption of scrutiny standards in future
cases without establishing one that must be used in every Second
Amendment analysis, because Heller merely declined to choose
rather than explicitly abandoning the possibility.135 Therefore, a
scrutiny analysis may still be within the reading of the Second
Amendment employed by Heller.
McDonald was the Supreme Court’s next chance to clear up
the confusion in the aftermath of Heller.136 The Court was faced
with determining the constitutionality of a Chicago ordinance that
made it illegal to possess a firearm in the home without a valid
registration.137 Coupled with another ordinance prohibiting the
registration of most handguns, the practical effect is essentially a
ban on handguns.138 This restriction is almost identical to the D.C.
restriction analyzed in Heller.139 While Justice Alito took the time
133. Id. (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument at 44, District of Columbia v.
Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (No. 07-290)).
134. See id. (quoting Transcript of Oral Argument at 44, District of Columbia
v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) (No. 07-290)) (questioning the need “in this case” to
establish an “all-encompassing standard”) (emphasis added)).
135. See id. (stating that the court “declined to specify exactly whether strict
scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny, or some other standard should be used”).
136. See id. at 707 (describing McDonald as the Supreme Court’s “second
skirmish” in the Second Amendment conflict).
137. See McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 750 (2010) (“A City
ordinance provides that ‘[n]o person shall . . . possess . . . any firearm unless such
person is the holder of a valid registration certificate for such firearm.’” (quoting
CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE § 8-20-040(a) (2009))).
138. See id. (“The Code then prohibits registration of most handguns, thus
effectively banning handgun possession by almost all private citizens who reside
in the City.”).
139. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 574–75 (2008) (“The
District of Columbia generally prohibits the possession of handguns. It is a crime
to carry an unregistered firearm, and the registration of handguns is
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to write an incredibly in-depth and well researched argument
spanning over forty pages, the opinion focuses purely on the issue
of incorporation to the states under the Fourteenth Amendment.140
The question of the ordinance’s constitutionality is given one
paragraph of consideration.141 Concluding that “a provision of the
Bill of Rights that protects a right that is fundamental from an
American perspective applies equally to the Federal Government
and the States,”142 the majority struck down the ordinance purely
under the justification that such a restriction was held to be
unconstitutional in Heller.143 Since McDonald, the Supreme Court
has not further answered the question.144 While it is clear that
bans on handgun possession in the home are unconstitutional,145
the Second Amendment remains without a clear test following
McDonald. Luckily, the circuit courts have begun to take matters
into their own hands.
Regardless of the majority’s actual desire in Heller, the circuit
courts have not adopted a strict categorical approach.146 Many
circuits begin by using a categorical approach to determine if the
class of people, type of weapon, or method of restriction at issue are
intended to receive protection under the Second Amendment.147 If
prohibited.”).
140. See McDonald, 561 U.S. at 748–91 (discussing the incorporation of the
Second Amendment to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment for almost
all of the majority opinion).
141. See id. at 791 (using the holding in Heller to quickly determine that the
Chicago ordinance is unconstitutional based on identical application of the Second
Amendment to the federal government and the states).
142. Id.
143. See id. (“In Heller, we held that the Second Amendment protects the
right to possess a handgun in the home for the purpose of self-defense.”).
144. The Court did take one more Second Amendment case, but in a short per
curiam opinion it struck down a ban on stun guns under Heller without further
analysis. See Caetano v. Massachusetts, 136 S.Ct. 1027, 1028 (2016) (per curiam).
145. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 635 (holding that the District’s ban on handguns
in the home is in violation of the Second Amendment); McDonald, 561 U.S. at 750
(following the precedent set by Heller that the Second Amendment protects the
right to possession of a handgun for self-defense in the home).
146. See infra Part IV.B.2 (analyzing the approach taken by many of the
circuits in determining the constitutionality of restrictions under the Second
Amendment).
147. See, e.g., Jackson v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 746 F.3d 953, 960 (9th
Cir. 2014) (testing first whether the prohibition “falls within the historical scope
of the Second Amendment”).
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the Second Amendment’s protection applies, the court employs a
sliding scale of strict and intermediate scrutiny to determine the
constitutionality of the restriction in question.148 The issues with
the strict categorical approach justify the use of the test employed
by the circuit courts, as will be shown in Part IV.B.
B. Application of Heller to New Regulations
Heller left many questions that need to be answered before
new regulations can be analyzed under the Second Amendment.149
To answer these questions and develop a test to apply to new
regulations, the categorical and balancing approaches discussed in
Heller are examined, and then the analysis used by the circuit
courts is explained.150 Then, a proper test to evaluate the MDHHS
regulations is chosen.151
1. Assessing Regulations Through Categorical Exclusions Versus
a General Balancing Test
Joseph Blocher, a Constitutional Law Professor at Duke
University School of Law who focuses on the First and Second
Amendments, notes that Heller presents a fight between two
possible approaches to Second Amendment challenges.152 The
majority pushed for a categorical approach after determining that
a balancing approach would open up the Second Amendment to
future judgments as to whether the Amendment’s protections
continue to be useful.153 The majority posits that a constitutional
148. See, e.g., id. at 961 (testing the restriction’s impact on the core of the
right, and the extent of the burden on the right, in determining the level of
scrutiny to apply).
149. See supra Part IV.A (describing the issues with Heller’s analysis of the
Second Amendment).
150. Infra Parts IV.B.1 and IV.B.2.
151. See infra Part IV.B.2 (concluding that the circuit court test is proper for
this analysis).
152. See Blocher, supra note 76, at 379–80 (describing two potential
approaches to the analysis of Second Amendment conflicts following Heller).
153. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 634–35 (2008)
(mentioning that a balancing approach would subject the Second Amendment to
“future judges’ assessments of its usefulness”).
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guarantee subject to such review in the future is “no constitutional
guarantee at all.”154 In dissent, Justice Breyer stressed the need
for a defined balancing standard, arguing that self-defense is not
dispositive of unconstitutionality, but it merely “raises questions
about the law’s constitutionality.”155 Historical evidence suggests
that the practicalities and rationales behind each law must be
considered before declaring it unconstitutional.156 While the
majority desired to preserve the strength of the Amendment by
avoiding a balancing approach, there are issues with developing a
purely categorical approach following Heller.157 This Part argues
that the categorical approach should be bolstered by a balancing
test in a two-step process.158
a. The Categorical Approach
The categorical approach draws a predetermined line between
those categories that are protected by the Second Amendment and
those that fall outside of the Amendment’s scope, making
membership in a certain category outcome-determinative.159 Such
an approach allows for the outcome to be determined at the outset
of the litigation based on the right and the mode in which it is
infringed.160 The benefit of categorization is that it conforms to
rules.161 Once the category is formed, it governs all subsequent
154. Id. at 634.
155. Id. at 687 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
156. Id. (“[T]o answer the questions that are raised . . . requires us to focus on
practicalities, the statute’s rationale, the problems that called it into being, [and]
its relation to those objectives . . . .”).
157. See infra Part IV.B.1.a (conducting a deeper analysis of the categorical
approach and the issues that arise in trying to apply it following Heller).
158. See infra Part IV.B.2 (recommending a two-step approach to analyzing
restrictions that conflict with the Second Amendment).
159. See Blocher, supra note 76, at 405 (addressing the categorical approach’s
exclusion of certain categories, such as felons and types of arms, from Second
Amendment protection).
160. See id. at 382 (stating that categoricalism allows cases to be governed
without any further reference to the background values); Kathleen M. Sullivan,
Post-Liberal Judging: The Roles of Categorization and Balancing, 63 U. COLO. L.
REV. 293, 294–96 (1992) (discussing the benefits of the consistency of a categorical
approach).
161. See Blocher, supra note 76, at 382 (noting that categoricalism allows
judges to create a rule that will bind in future cases); Kathleen M. Sullivan, The
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cases, and stops future judges from reweighing the values and
interests in any individual case.162
There are issues with the Court’s attempt to establish a
categorical framework for the Second Amendment.163 The Heller
majority compared the Second Amendment to the First
Amendment by positing that an interest balancing test had been
done at the time of the Second Amendment’s creation by the
people, and that the extent of its protection from that time should
remain stable.164 The majority asserts that the dissent’s balancing
approach would simply allow courts to reweigh interests that were
already considered, allowing future judges to change the scope of
the Amendment.165 However, the First Amendment has previously
been opened up to a balancing of interests that changes the scope
of its coverage at different times in history.166
There are also issues with the examples Heller presents. First,
the majority suggests the categorical exclusion of two groups—
felons and the mentally ill—from the Second Amendment’s
coverage.167 The majority never purports to justify such an
exclusion.168 The analysis undercuts the Court’s use of the First
and Fourth Amendments as justification for categorical exclusions,
because those Amendments do not restrict any subsets of people,
Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 HARV. L. REV. 22, 59 (1992) (“Categorization
corresponds to rules, balancing to standards.”).
162. See Blocher, supra note 76, at 382 (“[C]ategoricalism allows a judge to
transform some background value into a rule that will govern all subsequent
cases inside the category.”).
163. See id. at 405–30 (noting that there are issues in Heller’s category
examples).
164. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008) (“Like the First
[Amendment], [the Second] is the very product of an interest balancing by the
people—which Justice Breyer would now conduct for them anew.”).
165. See id. at 634–35 (“Constitutional rights are enshrined with the scope
they were understood to have when the people adopted them, whether or not
future legislatures or . . . judges think that scope too broad.”).
166. See, e.g., Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919) (determining
that speech may be protected in one situation but not in another, because “the
character of every act depends upon the circumstances in which it is done”).
167. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 626 (“[N]othing in our opinion should be taken to
cast doubt on longstanding prohibitions on the possession of firearms by felons
and the mentally ill . . . .”).
168. See Blocher, supra note 76, at 414 (describing it as unclear why these
groups should be excluded).
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including felons, from their protections.169 It is unclear how to
determine what groups can be excluded from coverage. Heller’s
only other potential guidance comes from the label of
presumptively constitutional exclusions as “longstanding,”170 and
explicitly extending the Second Amendment’s protection to
“law-abiding, responsible citizens.”171 Domestic violence
misdemeanants and undocumented immigrants have been
excluded from protection without Heller’s explicit approval.172
However, laws restricting immigrants and domestic violence
misdemeanants from possessing firearms do not meet the
longstanding requirement.173 Therefore, either falling outside of
the “law-abiding, responsible citizens”174 language alone is
sufficient or a balancing test is necessary to allow for more
restrictions outside of those categories excluded from protection.
Because Heller specifically aimed its exclusions at longstanding
restrictions,175 and to not require this would lead to more
confusion, adopting a balancing approach better justifies
validating more recent laws.

169. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 644 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (rejecting the
majority’s argument for using the First and Fourth Amendments to define “the
people” and then hinting at groups excluded from Second Amendment protection
who are not restricted under the First and Fourth Amendments).
170. Heller, 554 U.S. at 626.
171. Id. at 635.
172. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (2012) (criminalizing possession of a firearm by
different groups, including undocumented immigrants and domestic violence
misdemeanants). The confusion in interpretation has led to a circuit split on
whether undocumented immigrants are excluded from the Second Amendment’s
protection. See D. McNair Nichols, Note, Guns and Alienage: Correcting a
Dangerous Contradiction, 73 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 2089, 2101–02 (2016). There
are also disagreements among the circuit courts about whether domestic violence
misdemeanants are excluded from coverage. See infra notes 207–212 and
accompanying text.
173. See Stimmel v. Sessions, 879 F.3d 198, 205 (6th Cir. 2018) (determining
that prohibitions on domestic violence misdemeanant’s possession of firearms are
twentieth-century restrictions); United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 681 (4th
Cir. 2010) (noting the lack of historical gun restrictions on domestic violence
misdemeanants).
174. Heller, 554 U.S. at 635.
175. See id. at 626 (specifically noting “longstanding prohibitions” as those
which should not have doubt cast on them).
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Second, Heller attempted to pave the way for the enactment of
certain safe storage laws to prevent gun accidents.176 However, the
Court proceeded to invalidate a law aimed directly at the safe
storage of firearms.177 D.C. imposed a restriction that firearms in
the home must be “unloaded and dissembled or bound by a trigger
lock or similar device.”178 The Court invalidated this law on the
basis that it did not explicitly allow for self-defense, nor could a
self-defense exception be read in.179 The restrictions on foster
parents are regulations on storage similar to D.C.’s.180 In turn, the
Court’s failure to acknowledge the true existence of such a category
makes an analysis difficult under a solely categorical approach.
Finally, the Court acknowledges the constitutionality of
certain laws “forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive
places.”181 The two examples given are “schools and government
buildings.”182 However, Heller’s holding only extends to the private
home. Both examples given are places outside of this holding.183
Should these examples be read to extend the Second Amendment
outside of the home? Or should this exception be read to allow
restrictions in private homes when they can be considered a
sensitive place? Foster homes are private homes within the Second
Amendment’s protection—but are also arguably a “sensitive
place”184—so it is unclear whether they can be excluded as a
category under Heller. All of these issues justify strengthening the
176. See id. at 632 (“Nor, correspondingly, does our analysis suggest the
invalidity of laws regulating the storage of firearms to prevent accidents.”).
177. See id. at 630 (invalidating a safe-storage requirement).
178. Id. at 575.
179. See id. at 630 (stating that the law made it impossible for citizens to use
firearms for self-defense and explaining why an exception could not be read in).
180. Compare id. at 574 (“District of Columbia law . . . requires residents to
keep their lawfully owned firearms . . . ‘unloaded and dissembled or bound by a
trigger lock or similar device’ unless they are . . . being used for lawful recreational
activities.”), with MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 400.9415(3) (2018) (requiring firearms be
kept in locked storage or trigger locked, with ammunition locked in separate
storage).
181. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008).
182. Id.
183. See id. at 635 (holding the ban on “handgun possession in the home” and
prohibition against rendering firearms operable “in the home” unconstitutional)
(emphasis added).
184. Id. at 626.
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categorical approach with a balancing test to ease the confusion
left by Heller.
b. The Balancing Approach
The balancing approach consists of weighing the individual
interest in the Second Amendment right against the Government’s
interest in regulating that right.185 Balancing opens up
decision-making to the application of principles and policy to the
facts of a case, which risks a factual influence that a categorical
approach does not allow.186 Balancing generally leads to the
application of a certain level of scrutiny, which may vary
depending on the type of restriction.187 Justice Breyer, in dissent,
encouraged the use of a test that asks “whether the statute
imposes burdens that, when viewed in light of the statute’s
legitimate objectives, are disproportionate.”188 Breyer analyzed the
empirical arguments presented by Heller and asserted that the
Court must ask if these arguments are “strong enough to destroy
judicial confidence in the reasonableness of a legislature that
rejects them.”189 Breyer defends the use of balancing over a strict
categorical approach because different areas may have different
interests in restrictions. He cites the difference in incidents of gun
crime between urban and rural areas, an issue that an originalist
categorical approach cannot seemingly address.190 The method the
circuit courts use combines these two approaches and stays true to
Heller’s exclusions while filling in the holes the Court left.
185. See Blocher, supra note 76, at 381 (defining the balancing approach).
186. See id. (discussing how balancing involves the application of a principle
to facts, while categorization requires a determinative response); Sullivan, supra
note 161, at 58–59 (comparing balancing and categorization based on rules versus
standards).
187. See, e.g., Jackson v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 746 F.3d 953, 960–61
(9th Cir. 2014) (discussing the test for selecting an appropriate level of scrutiny).
188. Heller, 554 U.S. at 693 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
189. Id. at 702 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
190. See Blocher, supra note 76, at 412 (noting that Justice Breyer, following
his description of a balancing test, recognized the special interest of urban areas
with gun issues); Heller, 554 U.S. at 705 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“[D]eference to
legislative judgment seems particularly appropriate here, where the judgment
has been made by a local legislature, with particular knowledge of local problems
and insight into appropriate local solutions.”).
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2. Circuit Court Application of Heller

Following Heller, the circuit courts were challenged with
determining the constitutionality of many different kinds of
restrictions on gun possession and use.191 Because Heller and
McDonald relied on similarities between the First and Second
Amendment to establish the right to bear arms as an individual
right of the people,192 the circuit courts used these connections to
form a test analogous to the courts’ inquiry in First Amendment
cases.193 Under a categorical approach, certain classes of speech
have been recognized as falling outside of the protection of the
First Amendment.194 Outside of these classes, the courts have used
balancing in determining that restrictions on the manner in which
the First Amendment right is exercised, or restrictions that leave
open alternative channels to exercise the right, will be subject to
intermediate scrutiny.195 Taking from the First Amendment’s
mixed approach, the circuits have chosen to analyze the Second
Amendment under both in a two-step approach.196

191. See, e.g., Jackson, 746 F.3d at 958 (analyzing a challenge to California’s
safe storage laws); United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 677 (4th Cir. 2010)
(addressing a challenge to West Virginia’s law against possession by domestic
violence misdemeanants); United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 88 (3d Cir.
2010) (reviewing Pennsylvania’s law against possession of a firearm with a
destroyed serial number).
192. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 592 (2008) (recognizing
the similarities between the Second, First, and Fourth Amendments as
“pre-existing right[s]”); McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 778–79 (2010)
(suggesting that the Second Amendment should not be singled out for separate
treatment from the First and Fourth Amendments).
193. See Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 706–07 (7th Cir. 2011) (“Both
Heller and McDonald suggest that First Amendment analogues are more
appropriate, and on the strength of that suggestion, we and other circuits have
already begun to adapt First Amendment doctrine to the Second Amendment
context.” (internal citations omitted)).
194. See id. at 702 (recognizing certain categories of speech that are outside
of the First Amendment’s reach, such as obscenity or defamation) (citing United
States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 470 (2010)).
195. See Jackson v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 746 F.3d 953, 961 (9th Cir.
2014) (discussing the parallel between the First Amendment and the current
analysis) (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)).
196. See id. at 960 (describing the two-step approach used by the circuits);
Chester, 628 F.3d at 680 (applying the two-step approach); Marzzarella, 614 F.3d
at 89 (establishing the two-step approach).
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In the first step, the court determines whether the challenged
regulation burdens protected conduct or if the regulation falls
within the category of restrictions that historically are not
protected by the Second Amendment.197 This is the categorical
approach, which draws a line between protected conduct and those
laws considered to be “presumptively lawful regulatory
measures.”198 In Jackson v. City and County of San Francisco,199
the Ninth Circuit applied this standard.200 The court asked two
questions to determine if the restrictions fell outside of the Second
Amendment’s protection.201 First, the court looked to the
“presumptively lawful measures” identified in Heller.202 These are
identified as the specific restrictions mentioned by the Heller
majority, including restrictions on felons and the mentally ill, laws
forbidding possession in sensitive places, restrictions on the sale of
arms, and prohibitions on dangerous and uncommon weapons.203
The second question attempts to determine if there are
categories outside of those mentioned explicitly in Heller.204 For
this analysis, the court asked “whether the record includes
persuasive historical evidence establishing that the regulation at
issue imposes prohibitions that fall outside the historical scope of
the Second Amendment.”205
When deciding the first question, the circuit courts are
inconsistent in determining what measures related to classes of
people are “presumptively lawful”206 outside of the examples
197. See Jackson, 746 F.3d at 960 (discussing the first step of the analysis).
198. Id. (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 627 n.26).
199. 746 F.3d 953 (9th Cir. 2014).
200. See id. at 961 (determining if the challenged law burdens conduct within
the Second Amendment’s protection).
201. See id. at 962 (asking if it is “presumptively lawful” under Heller, or if
history suggests that it should be).
202. See id. at 960 (“[W]e ask whether the regulation is one of the
‘presumptively lawful regulatory measures’ identified in Heller . . . .” (internal
citations omitted)).
203. See id. at 959 (summarizing the potential regulations that are
constitutional).
204. See id. at 960 (discussing that the analysis considers those restrictions
Heller identified or one which falls outside of the historical scope of the Second
Amendment).
205. Id. at 960.
206. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 627 n.26 (2008).
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explicitly listed throughout Heller. This is seen in the split over the
constitutionality of the federal law restricting domestic violence
misdemeanants from possessing firearms.207 Despite being outside
of Heller’s explicit mention of “law-abiding, responsible citizens,”208
the Fourth and Ninth Circuits determined that the federal law
restricting domestic violence misdemeanants from possessing or
receiving firearms did not clearly fall under Heller’s categorical
exclusions from Second Amendment protection.209 The courts
recognized the lack of historic evidence of such restrictions, with
the Ninth Circuit specifically noting that domestic violence
misdemeanants were not prohibited from possessing firearms
until 1996.210 Similarly, the First and Seventh Circuits upheld the
same statute after an application of intermediate or heightened
scrutiny rather than outright recognizing the statute as
presumptively lawful.211 However, the Eleventh Circuit found the
statute to be analogous to the ban on possession by felons, and
determined that it was presumptively lawful under Heller.212 It is
clear that even when a restriction falls on a class outside of
law-abiding, responsible citizens, the courts are still skeptical
about categorically excluding full classes of people from the Second
Amendment’s protection.
207. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9) (2012) (making it a crime for domestic violence
misdemeanants to possess a firearm).
208. Heller, 554 U.S. at 635.
209. See United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 681 (4th Cir. 2010) (assuming
that the defendant’s Second Amendment rights are still intact); United States v.
Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1137 (9th Cir. 2013) (“We must assume, therefore, that
[Chovan]’s Second Amendment rights are intact . . . .”).
210. See Chovan, 735 F.3d at 1137 (“Because of ‘the lack of historical evidence
in the record before us, we are certainly not able to say that the Second
Amendment, as historically understood, did not apply to persons convicted of
domestic violence misdemeanors.’” (quoting Chester, 735 F.3d at 681)); Chester,
628 F.3d at 681 (mentioning the lack of government contention and historical
evidence that domestic violence misdemeanants were historically unprotected by
the Second Amendment).
211. See United States v. Booker, 644 F.3d 12, 25 (1st Cir. 2011) (determining
that a categorical ban requires a “substantial relationship between the restriction
and an important governmental objective”); United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d
638, 641 (7th Cir. 2010) (noting that § 922(g)(9) is valid only if “substantially
related to an important governmental objective”).
212. See United States v. White, 593 F.3d 1199, 1206 (11th Cir. 2010) (“We
now explicitly hold that § 922(g)(9) is a presumptively lawful ‘longstanding
prohibition[] on the possession of firearms.’” (quoting Heller, 554 U.S. at 626)).
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The courts are also skeptical about creating a category of
restrictions regarding storage. The Ninth Circuit reviewed a San
Francisco ordinance that requires handguns within a residence be
locked in a storage container, disabled by a trigger lock, or carried
on the person.213 Despite recognizing that a Massachusetts storage
law existed in 1783, the court acknowledged that Heller construed
that statute narrowly, and recognized the law to be an outlier.214
Similarly, the Court determined storage laws regarding
gunpowder were geared towards fire safety and were not
dispositive of the issue.215 The safe storage law was determined not
to be outside of Second Amendment protection based on the lack of
historical evidence of such restrictions.216
If the court determines that the law falls within the Second
Amendment’s protection, then it moves on to the second step,
where the court proceeds to apply an “appropriate level of
scrutiny.”217 The second step follows its own two-question
analysis.218 First, the court asks how close the law’s burden comes
to the core of the Second Amendment.219 As discussed, Heller
established that the core of the right is the purpose of
self-defense.220 Second, the court analyzes how severe of a burden
is placed on the right.221 A law that places a severe burden on the
core of the Second Amendment right will be found unconstitutional
under any level of scrutiny.222 However, the circuit courts have
213. See Jackson v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 746 F.3d 953, 958 (9th Cir.
2014) (describing the restrictions set forth in San Francisco Police Code Section
4512).
214. See id. at 962–63 (discerning the current regulations from those
restricting loaded weapons from being allowed inside homes in 1783).
215. See id. at 963 (describing gunpowder laws from the 18th century as
“fire-safety regulations,” and suggesting that the Second Amendment applies to
the case).
216. See id. (“The other historical evidence in the record does not establish
that prohibitions such as those in section 4512 fall outside the scope of the Second
Amendment, as historically understood.” (internal quotations omitted)).
217. Id. at 962.
218. See id. at 961 (discussing the analysis under the second prong of the test).
219. See id. (laying out the second step analysis).
220. See supra note 83 and accompanying text (noting Heller’s decision as to
the core of the Second Amendment right).
221. See Jackson, 746 F.3d at 961 (setting out the second piece of the analysis
in determining the level of scrutiny).
222. See id. (discussing the analysis for laws which fail both tests in the
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determined laws that do not burden the core of the right, or that
do not place substantial restrictions on that right, will allow the
court to apply intermediate scrutiny.223 Such restrictions may
simply restrict the manner in which the right may be used, or leave
ample alternative channels for the exercise of the right.224
The circuits have been fairly uniform when answering the first
question. The Third,225 Fourth,226 Sixth,227 Ninth,228 Tenth,229
Eleventh, 230 and D.C. Circuits231 have all determined that the core
of the Second Amendment recognized in Heller is the “right of
law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth
and home.”232 The Ninth Circuit determined that restrictions on
storage of firearms in the home surely burden the core of the right,
as they directly affect the ability of an individual to use his

second step).
223. See id. (addressing the analysis of laws which do not severely burden the
right to self defense).
224. See id. (describing potential restrictions that may be granted
intermediate scrutiny review).
225. See United States v. Marzzarella, 614 F.3d 85, 89 (3d Cir. 2010)
(discussing the Heller determination that the core purpose of the Second
Amendment is to allow law-abiding citizens to use firearms for self-defense in the
home).
226. See United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 683 (4th Cir. 2010) (defining
the core right identified by Heller as “the right of a law-abiding, responsible
citizen to possess and carry a weapon for self-defense”).
227. See United States v. Greeno, 679 F.3d 510, 517 (6th Cir. 2012) (citing
Heller in determining the core of the Second Amendment to be self-defense in the
home).
228. See Jackson v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 746 F.3d 953, 961 (9th Cir.
2014) (defining the core of the Second Amendment as self-defense by law-abiding
citizens).
229. See United States v. Reese, 627 F.3d 792, 800 (10th Cir. 2010) (“[T]he
Court suggested that the core purpose of the right was to allow law-abiding,
responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth and home.” (internal
quotations omitted)).
230. See GeorgiaCarry.Org, Inc. v. Georgia, 687 F.3d 1244, 1259 (11th Cir.
2012) (stating that the right to self-defense is the “central component” of the
Second Amendment).
231. See Heller v. District of Columbia (Heller II), 670 F.3d 1244, 1255 (D.C.
Cir. 2011) (describing the burden the law in question placed on “purpose of
self-defense in the home—the ‘core lawful purpose’ protected by the Second
Amendment” (quoting District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 630 (2008))).
232. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008).
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firearms to defend himself in his home.233 In another case, the
Ninth Circuit determined that the core is not burdened by
restrictions on possession by persons who do not fit into the
category of “law-abiding, responsible citizens,” such as domestic
violence misdemeanants.234 This reasoning was used in the Fourth
Circuit as well.235 For those regulations that do not burden the
Second Amendment, the analysis of the regulation is done under
intermediate scrutiny.236 For those that do burden the core, the
second question must be answered before a level of scrutiny can be
tested.237
The second question asks whether the burden on the core of
the Amendment is substantial.238 In Jackson, the court determined
that the restriction did not impose a substantial burden on the core
of the Second Amendment.239 The reasoning was that the
regulations simply controlled the manner in which the right was
regulated, and did not amount to a prevention of the exercise of the
right.240 This decision has not gone unquestioned, with Justice
Scalia and Justice Thomas dissenting from the denial of
certiorari.241 The Justices feared that any restriction found to
burden the core of the Amendment is a threat to the right, and that
the Supreme Court should answer the question of whether the
233. See Jackson, 746 F.3d at 964 (“Section 4512 therefore burdens the core
of the Second Amendment right.”).
234. See United States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1138 (9th Cir. 2013)
(“Section 922(g)(9) does not implicate this core Second Amendment right because
it regulates firearm possession for individuals with criminal convictions.”).
235. See Chester, 628 F.3d at 683 (determining that the claim is outside of the
core of the Second Amendment due to Chester’s criminal history).
236. See, e.g., id. (“[W]e conclude that intermediate scrutiny is more
appropriate than strict scrutiny for Chester and similarly situated persons.”).
237. See Jackson, 746 F.3d at 964 (stating that the core analysis is not the
end of the court’s inquiry).
238. See supra note 221 and accompanying text (summarizing the second
question).
239. See Jackson v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 746 F.3d 953, 964 (9th Cir.
2014) (“Section 4512 does not impose the sort of severe burden that requires the
higher level of scrutiny applied by other courts . . . .”).
240. See id. (stating that the restriction was only on the “manner in which
persons may exercise their Second Amendment rights” (quoting Chovan, 735 F.3d
at 1138)).
241. See Jackson v. City & Cty. of San Francisco (Jackson II), 135 S. Ct. 2799,
2802 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (dissenting from the denial of certiorari).
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restriction is constitutional.242 Similarly, the D.C. Circuit found
that bans on assault weapons and large capacity magazines do not
prevent an individual from possessing a firearm in the home for
self-defense, and, therefore, the burden was not substantial.243
Each of these cases applied intermediate scrutiny to test the
regulation in question.244
In contrast, the Seventh Circuit’s review of a blanket ban on
carrying an operable firearm in public and a Chicago ban on firing
ranges determined each to be substantial burdens which amounted
to prohibitions on exercising the Second Amendment right.245 The
court required an analysis higher than intermediate scrutiny be
applied to these substantial burdens.246 Finally, the Ninth Circuit
recognized that a law that imposes a burden on the core of the
Second Amendment severe enough to essentially destroy the right
is “unconstitutional under any level of scrutiny.”247 These cases
amount to three potential levels of scrutiny which may be applied
to a burden on the core right of the Second Amendment. Because
this test is able to fall within the categorical approach designed by
Heller while also filling the holes left by the Supreme Court, it is
the best test under which to analyze the MDHHS regulation.248

242. See id. (Thomas, J., dissenting) (recognizing that the court of appeals
determined that the law burdened the core of the right, and calling the court of
appeals’ judgment “questionable”).
243. See Heller II, 670 F.3d 1244, 1262 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“[W]e are reasonably
certain the prohibitions do not impose a substantial burden upon [the Second
Amendment] right.”).
244. See id. at 1261–62 (determining intermediate scrutiny was appropriate);
Jackson, 746 F.3d at 965 (“[W]e apply intermediate scrutiny.”).
245. See Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 940 (7th Cir. 2012) (determining
that a ban on carrying firearms in public was a substantial curtailment of the
Second Amendment right); Ezell v. City of Chicago, 651 F.3d 684, 708 (7th Cir.
2011) (describing the law as a “serious encroachment” on an “important corollary”
to the Second Amendment’s core right).
246. See e.g., Ezell, 651 F.3d at 708 (“All this suggests that a more rigorous
showing than [intermediate scrutiny] should be required, if not quite ‘strict
scrutiny.’”).
247. Jackson, 746 F.3d at 961.
248. See infra Part V.A (describing why this test is the best to use in this
situation).
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V. Applying the Test to the Michigan Regulation
The MDHHS regulation must be subjected to a test to
determine if it is constitutional. This Part describes why the test
applied by the circuit courts is the best option.249 Next, it analyzes
whether foster parents are categorically excluded from Second
Amendment protection as a class.250 Then, should they fall under
the Second Amendment’s protection, the two-step approach,
discussed in Part IV.B.2, determines a proper level of scrutiny.251
Finally, this Part draws a conclusion on the constitutionality of the
regulation after testing it under the proper scrutiny.252
A. The Proper Test to Analyze the Michigan Restrictions
For the purposes of the current analysis, the review laid out
by the circuit courts253 appears to be the best method to test the
regulations in question. Two potential approaches exist—a
categorical approach and an interest balancing test.254 While the
majority in Heller was guiding the Court towards a
categorical-only review, it left too many holes to properly apply
that method following the decision.255 Not only does the circuit
courts’ two-prong approach have the potential to provide better
coverage for some of the weaknesses in each approach256 by adding
the strengths of the other, but it also allows for both a balancing
test and a categorical test to be done on the regulation.257 If the
249. Infra Part V.A.
250. See supra Part IV.B.2 (discussing the first step of the circuit court test
being used to analyze the current restriction).
251. See supra Part IV.B.2 (laying out the proper approach to determining the
level of scrutiny that a regulation should be subject to when it burdens conduct
protected by the Second Amendment).
252. Infra Part V.D.
253. See supra Part III.B.2 (describing the approach commonly used by circuit
courts in interpreting the Second Amendment).
254. See supra Part III.B.1 (discussing both the categorical and balancing
approach).
255. See supra Part III.B.1 (laying out an analysis of the weaknesses of the
categorical approach that Heller attempts to create).
256. See supra Part III.B.1 (noting shortcomings in each approach).
257. See supra Part III.B.2 (setting out both the categorical and balancing
sides to the circuit court test).
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Supreme Court determines that one of the two is the sole test to be
used, the regulation will already be analyzed under each, allowing
for the test to remain partially applicable. Also, Heller relied on the
First Amendment as an analogy when supporting the refusal to
adopt an interest balancing approach.258 The First Amendment
has frequently been analyzed under this approach as well,
justifying its use under Heller.259 Finally, should the Supreme
Court decide not to take up any more Second Amendment cases,
this test represents the likely style of appellate review to be
applied should any regulation be challenged.
B. Part 1: Is the Burdened Conduct Protected by the Second
Amendment?
The first question asks whether the conduct burdened by the
regulations is protected by the Second Amendment.260 Initially,
Heller specifically recognized that certain “longstanding”
measures would be presumed lawful.261 It is clear that these
restrictions are a new development and cannot be justified simply
by their longstanding nature.262 However, this alone does not
dispose of the question as to whether the prohibited conduct is
protected by the Second Amendment.263 There still may be other
factors that could exclude foster parents from protection, so further
analysis is necessary.
258. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 634–35 (2008)
(referencing the First Amendment multiple times in justifying the majority
approach to the Second Amendment).
259. See Jackson v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 746 F.3d 953, 961 (9th Cir.
2014) (citing Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989)) (discussing
the parallel between the First Amendment and the current analysis).
260. See id. at 960 (determining that the analysis should start by questioning
if the burdened conduct is even protected by the Second Amendment).
261. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 626 (noting that the opinion should not “cast
doubt” on certain prohibitions existing before the decision).
262. See Everytown Brief, supra note 42, at 10 (conceding that laws
prohibiting irresponsible storage of firearms by foster parents are a “product of
modern society” without a “precise historical analogue”).
263. See United States v. Greeno, 679 F.3d 510, 519 (6th Cir. 2012)
(recognizing that the fact that a law was “not enacted until recently does not
automatically render the [regulated conduct] within the scope of the Second
Amendment right as historically understood”).
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As recognized above, Heller presented five potential types of
categories that may be excluded from protection, including
restrictions on: (1) certain people, (2) certain places, (3) the sale of
firearms, (4) certain types of weapons, and (5) storage to prevent
accidents.264 Nothing in the MDHHS regulations, or any of the
state regulations, relates to the type of firearm or the sale of
firearms, so those will not be analyzed.265 To see if foster parents
may be excluded from Second Amendment protection under Heller,
three exceptions will be tested. First, foster parents may constitute
a class of people.266 Next, Heller recognized that certain places may
justify restrictions on their premises,267 so the foster home is
considered under this possibility.268 Finally, the specific storage
requirements are analyzed to see if Heller’s specific exception for
accident prevention applies.269 These will be analyzed in light of
the fact that courts are skeptical to extend these categories beyond
Heller’s specific examples.270 Then, this Note explores whether the
Second Amendment right can be relinquished through a voluntary
contract, allowing courts to disregard Heller.271

264. See supra notes 111–115 and accompanying text (pulling the five
potential classes that are excluded from the Second Amendment based on Heller’s
examples).
265. See MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 400.9415(3) (2018) (regulating the storage of
firearms in general, making no distinction between type, and making no mention
of the sale of firearms); infra Figure 1 (listing the restrictions in each state on
storage alone).
266. See infra Part V.B.1 (determining whether foster parents as a class are
excluded from the Second Amendment’s protection).
267. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27 (“[N]othing in our opinion should be taken
to cast doubt on . . . laws forbidding the carrying of firearms in sensitive
places . . . .”).
268. Infra Part V.B.2.
269. Infra Part V.B.3; see also Heller, 554 U.S. at 632 (“Nor, correspondingly,
does our analysis suggest the invalidity of laws regulating the storage of firearms
to prevent accidents.”).
270. See supra Part VI.B.2 (discussing the circuit courts’ extension of Heller’s
categories).
271. Infra Part V.B.4.
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1. Foster Parents as a Class of People

Heller only gave two examples of classes of people who may be
subject to presumptively lawful restrictions.272 These examples are
felons and mentally ill persons,273 both regulated at the federal and
state levels.274 The Heller Court did not mean for this list to
exhaust all possible classes,275 and some other classes of people
have been regulated by either federal or state law. These classes
include domestic violence misdemeanants or persons under a
domestic violence restraining order, undocumented immigrants,
illegal drug users, former military members who were
dishonorably discharged, and minors.276
These groups differ from foster parents in two ways. First, the
restrictions on these groups seems to best be justified by the
dangers that the restricted person would pose with a firearm based
on a tendency towards crime or lack of reason.277 Foster parents,
on the other hand, are restricted because of the danger that a third
party—the foster child—might pose if they gained access to the
firearm.278 While this is a risk the state has an interest in
272. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008) (noting that
Heller should not be read to “cast doubt” on certain restrictions, such as
possession by the mentally ill and felons).
273. See id. (recognizing restrictions on felons and the mentally ill as
prohibitions that should not be looked at with doubt following Heller).
274. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), (g)(4) (2012) (criminalizing the possessing,
receiving, or transporting of a firearm by any person convicted of a crime
punishable by imprisonment of longer than a year, and by any person adjudicated
as “a mental defective” or who has been “committed to a mental institution”).
275. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 627 n.26 (“[O]ur list does not purport to be
exhaustive.”).
276. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 922(g) (prohibiting possession, transporting, or
receiving of a firearm by felons, unlawful drug users, mentally ill persons,
undocumented or nonimmigrant aliens, persons who have been discharged from
the military under “dishonorable conditions,” persons with restraining orders
against them by an “intimate partner,” and domestic violence misdemeanants);
id. § 922(x)(2) (making it unlawful for a juvenile to possess a handgun or
ammunition suitable for a handgun).
277. See, e.g., United States v. Dugan, 657 F.3d 998, 999 (9th Cir. 2011)
(justifying restriction of habitual drug users from possessing firearms because
“like career criminals and the mentally ill, [habitual drug users] more likely will
have difficulty exercising self-control”).
278. See Everytown Brief, supra note 42, at 3–7 (citing statistics of the
dangers posed to children by firearms through suicide and accidents but saying
nothing about foster parents being dangerous).
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mitigating,279 there appear to be no examples of lawful restrictions
that fully remove a person from Second Amendment protection to
prevent the harm by third parties. Such potential injuries are
normally regulated by placing restrictions on the risky individual,
such as juveniles;280 by punishing negligent storage instead of
strictly regulating the method of storage;281 or by restricting
storage, but with an exception for firearms under the control of the
owner.282 This Note does not confirm the constitutionality of those
restrictions, but they are not as severe of a restriction on the
Second Amendment as those placed on foster parents to prevent
harm by third parties regardless of validity.
Second, the Supreme Court specifically stated that the Second
Amendment “surely elevates above all other interests the right of
law-abiding, responsible citizens to use arms in defense of hearth
and home.”283 Each of the groups mentioned above fall outside of
these categories: (1) the mentally ill and juveniles would likely not
be considered “responsible;”284 (2) undocumented immigrants are
not “citizens;”285 and (3) the others fall outside of the
“law-abiding”286 language. For each of these, the entire category
falls outside of the law-abiding and responsible framework. Foster
parents do not, as a class, fall outside of this framework.
Individually, foster parents are held to a high standard. Federal
law requires states to submit prospective foster parents to
background checks.287 Certain crimes automatically disqualify an
279. See supra Part II.B (describing Michigan’s interest in regulating firearm
storage in the foster home).
280. See 18 U.S.C. § 922(x)(2) (prohibiting possession of handguns by
juveniles).
281. See, e.g., HAW. REV. STAT. § 707-714.5 (2018) (criminalizing negligent
storage of a firearm if a minor obtains access to the firearm).
282. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 25135 (West 2018) (requiring persons who
own or reside in a residence with a person prohibited from owning, possessing, or
receiving a firearm to keep any firearms in the residence in locked storage or on
their person).
283. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 635 (2008).
284. Id.
285. Id.
286. Id.
287. See 42 U.S.C. § 671(a)(20)(A) (2012) (requiring for states to “provide[]
procedures for criminal records checks . . . for any prospective foster or adoptive
parent before the foster or adoptive parent may be finally approved”).
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applicant or require revocation of a license,288 and the states still
have discretion to disqualify applicants convicted of other offenses
if they are not of good character.289 For example, Michigan requires
foster home licensees be “of such physical, mental, and emotional
health to assure appropriate care of children,”290 and “[b]e of
responsible character.”291 The state also requires good character
and mental and emotional health of other members of the foster
home.292 The agency conducts a criminal record check of all
members of the household, including any who move in.293 MDHHS
also requires the licensee to assist in determining whether each of
these requirements is met.294 Finally, MDHHS requires an update
of any changes regarding these requirements on an ongoing
basis,295 and may revoke the license of any person who
substantially violates these rules.296 Therefore, individual foster
parents are required by the state to be law-abiding and
responsible. While Heller did not present the full list of potential
exclusions, the “law-abiding, responsible citizen” language
explicitly pulls foster parents within the Second Amendment’s
protection. While this is not dispositive of the issue of
constitutionality and further analysis is necessary, foster parents,
as a class, are not excluded from Second Amendment protection.

288. See id. (listing crimes for which a past conviction would be disqualifying);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.115(9)–(10) (West 2018) (mandating revocation of
a license based on certain criminal convictions).
289. See MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 400.9201 (2018) (specifying the qualifications
for approval of a foster home, including requiring that a licensee be “of good moral
character”).
290. Id.
291. Id.
292. See id. r. 400.9202 (listing the requirements for members of the
household).
293. See id. r. 400.9205 (requiring a record check of each individual in the
household).
294. See id. r. 400.9206 (stating what licensees must assist the agency in
determining).
295. See id. r. 400.9207 (allowing for reevaluations throughout the license
period).
296. See id. § 722.121(2) (describing the power of revocation).
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2. Foster Homes as a Sensitive Area
Heller left open the ability to restrict possession of firearms in
certain areas designated as “sensitive places.”297 The two examples
given are government buildings and schools.298 The foster home is
more sensitive than a normal home. The foster home contains
children who are the direct responsibility of the state.299 Also, the
state has a limited duty to protect the child from a dangerous foster
home.300 However, there is one major difference between the foster
home and the examples given that is likely dispositive. The
examples given in Heller are spaces that do not seemingly fall
within Heller’s holding, as is, because neither of the examples
given describes a private home.301 The Supreme Court has never
taken up the question of whether the Second Amendment protects
the right to possess a firearm outside of the home.302 Even without
Heller’s acknowledgment of an exception, laws prohibiting
firearms in public places or in private schools may not be within
the protection of the Second Amendment regardless of how
“sensitive” they may be. The private home is specifically protected
in Heller as the place where the need for defense is “most acute.”303
A foster home, while subject to extra state control, remains a
private home.304 While there is an interest of the state in protecting
the child, that is an analysis that should be left to a scrutiny test

297. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 626 (2008).
298. See id. (providing examples of “sensitive places” that may be subject to
“presumptively lawful” restrictions).
299. See, e.g., MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 400.10(1)(c) (2018) (defining “foster care”
as “24-hour substitute care for children placed away from their parents or
guardians and for whom the state agency has placement and care responsibility”
(emphasis added)).
300. See Doe ex rel. Johnson v. S.C. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 597 F.3d 163, 176 (4th
Cir. 2010) (determining that the state had a duty to refrain from placing a foster
child in a known dangerous environment).
301. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 635 (confining each of the Court’s holdings to “the
home”).
302. See Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 935 (7th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he Supreme
Court has not yet addressed the question whether the Second Amendment creates
a right of self-defense outside the home.”).
303. Heller, 554 U.S. at 628.
304. See, e.g., MICH. COMP. LAWS § 722.111 (2018) (“Private home includes a
full-time foster family home . . . .”).
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and should not be dispositive of a restriction inside of any private
home.
3. Reasonable Restrictions to Prevent Accidents
The Court did not present any examples of the final exception:
reasonable restrictions to prevent accidents.305 The extent of the
accident prevention exception is the statement: “Nor,
correspondingly, does our analysis suggest the invalidity of laws
regulating the storage of firearms to prevent accidents.”306 The
regulations in question are specifically directed at storage,307 and
their purpose is directly aimed at preventing accidents and
stopping access by prohibited persons.308 Seemingly, the wording
of Heller would apply to the regulations at hand if read with the
little guidance given. However, Heller followed that statement by
declaring a law requiring trigger locks on all lawfully owned
firearms unconstitutional because of the burden it placed on the
ability to use a firearm for self-defense.309 The regulations at hand
require storage either with a trigger lock or in a locked cabinet or
safe.310 The holding of Heller seems to directly exclude the ability
to justify the MDHHS regulation under the accident prevention
exception. A locked safe or cabinet is no less of a burden than a
device directly locking the firearm. In addition, the requirements
of keeping the gun unloaded and locking the ammunition
separately increases the burden beyond what Heller found
unconstitutionally onerous.
305. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 632 (mentioning the validity of regulations aimed
at storage to prevent accidents without describing potential methods).
306. Id.
307. See MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 400.9415(3) (2018) (regulating the manner in
which firearms are stored within the foster home).
308. See Everytown Brief, supra note 42, at 7 (discussing the dangers of child
access to firearms in the home and the risk of accidents that comes with it); see
also 18 U.S.C. § 922(x)(2) (2012) (criminalizing the possession of firearms by
juveniles).
309. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 630 (2008) (“[T]he
District’s requirement . . . that firearms in the home be rendered and kept
inoperable at all times . . . is hence unconstitutional.”).
310. See MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 400.9415(3) (2018) (requiring that firearms are
“[s]tored in a locked . . . gun safe” or “[t]rigger-locked and stored without
ammunition in a locked area”).
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Heller specifically acknowledged the lack of a self-defense
exception in the D.C. statute.311 Also, other states and
municipalities that have enacted similar storage requirements to
the Michigan regulation allow an exception for direct control and
possession of the firearm.312 Only South Carolina has such an
exception in foster homes.313 Under Heller, it seems that there is
no way to read in a self-defense exception to the Michigan
regulations, and those like it.314 Also, while the Supreme Court has
not determined the constitutionality of storage laws with an
exception for personally carrying the firearm, the validity of such
a statute would not be analogous to the MDHHS regulations
because no such option exists.315 The regulations in question
directly violate Heller, and therefore cannot be read to fall within
the accident prevention exception.
4. Voluntary Entry into a State Program
The next potential avenue for excluding foster parents from
the protection of the Second Amendment is that the foster program
is a voluntary, contractual agreement that allows the waiver of all
Second Amendment rights.316 There is no constitutional right to be
a foster parent,317 and the foster parents receive funding in return
311. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 630 (rejecting the argument that a self-defense
exception can be read in to the D.C. statute).
312. See, e.g., MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 140, § 131l (2018) (“[S]uch weapon shall
not be deemed stored or kept if carried by or under the control of the owner or
other lawfully authorized user.”).
313. See S.C. CODE ANN. REGS. 114-550(H)(18) (2018) (“Firearms and any
ammunition shall be kept in a locked storage container except when being legally
carried upon the foster parent’s person . . . .”).
314. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 630 (refusing to read a self-defense exception
where none is explicitly mentioned).
315. See MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 400.9415(3) (2018) (creating no exception for
firearms carried by a person).
316. See generally MICH. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., DHS-1709,
DEPARTMENT/FOSTER
PARENT
AGREEMENT
(2018),
https://www.michigan.gov/documents/dhs/DHS-1798_Department_Foster_Parent_
Agreement_320174_7.pdf (requiring foster parents to follow all agency licensing rules).
317. See Defendant’s Memorandum in Support of His Motion to Dismiss at 8,
Shults v. Sheldon, 2:16-cv-02214 (C.D. Ill. Nov. 16, 2016) (“No court has found
that there is a constitutional right to be a foster parent.”).
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for fostering children.318 In addition, courts have determined that
foster parents do not have the same constitutional liberty interest
as biological families in keeping the family together once the
relationship has been formed.319 The possibility of some liberty
interest in foster families exists in long-term foster relationships
or existing familial relationships.320 However, because most of the
families burdened by these restrictions will not have such an
interest, the restrictions must be analyzed as if the ability to be a
foster parent is a benefit and not a right.
The states may argue that any person may fully exercise their
Second Amendment right by not becoming a foster parent.321
“[F]oster parents do not enjoy the same constitutional protections
that natural parents do,”322 and have been forced to sacrifice in
other areas that raise questions of constitutionality, such as the
First and Fourth Amendments.323
Foster parents are treated as independent contractors, and on
occasion employees, in their relationship with the state.324 “[T]he
318. See, e.g., MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 400.2023 (2018) (setting out the rules for
receiving state reimbursement as a foster parent).
319. See, e.g., Kyees v. Cty. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 600 F.2d 693, 699 (7th Cir.
1979) (“[T]he question left open by the Supreme Court in Smith should be decided
adversely to the existence of a liberty interest in a foster care arrangement of the
nature and duration considered here.”); Drummond v. Fulton Cty. Dep’t of Family
& Children’s Servs., 563 F.2d 1200, 1208 (5th Cir. 1977) (en banc) (“[W]e conclude
that the Drummonds have no protectable liberty interest in this case.”).
320. See Smith v. Org. of Foster Families for Equal. & Reform, 431 U.S. 816,
847 (1977) (“[The foster parents’] claim to a constitutionally protected liberty
interest raises complex and novel questions. It is unnecessary for us to resolve
those questions definitively in this case.”); Brown v. San Joaquin Cty., 601 F.
Supp. 653, 665 (E.D. Cal. 1985) (“[T]he court concludes that the foster family
relationship is sufficiently similar to other familial relationships held by the
Supreme Court to be entitled to constitutional protection.”).
321. See Defendant’s Memorandum in Support of His Motion to Dismiss at 9,
Shults v. Sheldon, No. 2:16-cv-02214 (C.D. Ill., Nov. 16, 2016) (“If [the Shultses]
choose to no longer be foster parents, they will not be subject to any of the
restrictions that they complain of.”).
322. Backlund v. Barnhart, 778 F.2d 1386, 1389 (9th Cir. 1985).
323. See infra notes 344–362 and accompanying text (discussing the potential
conflicts between foster home regulation and the First and Fourth Amendments).
324. See, e.g., Mitzner ex rel. Bishop v. State, 891 P.2d 435, 439 (Kan. 1995)
(“Limiting our choice of status to employee or independent contractor, the latter
is the appropriate categorization of a foster parent.”); Nichol v. Stass, 735 N.E.2d
582, 587 (Ill. 2000) (“[W]e must conclude that the [foster parents] were
independent contractors rather than employees or agents of the state.”); see also
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government as employer indeed has far broader powers than does
the government as sovereign.”325 The Supreme Court has limited
this by establishing that employment’s voluntary nature does not
allow the government to unreasonably infringe on the
constitutional rights of employees.326 However, the courts have
never discussed the topic of unconstitutional conditions in the
context of foster care or the Second Amendment. This Note will
next look at the application of the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine in the First Amendment to see how it might apply to the
Second Amendment question presented. Next, this section will
look at other potential conflicts that arise between restrictions on
foster parents and constitutional rights to see if they can guide the
question in the foster care context.
The Supreme Court has held on multiple occasions that the
voluntary nature of employment is not alone sufficient to justify
the waiver of constitutional rights.327 The Court has applied this in
the employment context for hiring,328 firing,329 and nonrenewal of
a contract.330 The same standard has been extended to protect
independent contractors with pre-existing relationships with the
government from having their contract terminated for exercising
their First Amendment rights.331 The Court has not had the
opportunity to answer this question as it pertains to independent
Hunte v. Blumenthal, 680 A.2d 1231, 1235 (Conn. 1996) (“[T]he [foster parents]
qualify as employees of the state and are not independent contractors.”).
325. Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 671 (1994).
326. See Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972) (recognizing that the
court has held on multiple occasions that unconstitutional conditions may not be
placed on the receipt of government benefits).
327. See, e.g., id. (“For at least a quarter-century, this Court has made clear
that even though a person has no ‘right’ to a valuable governmental
benefit . . . [the government] may not deny a benefit to a person on a basis that
infringes his constitutionally protected interests . . . .”).
328. See Rutan v. Republican Party of Ill., 497 U.S. 62, 79 (1990) (extending
First Amendment protections to employees in hiring decisions).
329. See Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 372 (1976) (applying First Amendment
protections to employees dismissed for their political beliefs).
330. See Perry, 408 U.S. at 598 (stating that the Court has held on multiple
occasions that nonrenewal of a nontenured teacher’s contract may not be based
on the exercise of First or Fourteenth Amendment rights).
331. See Bd. of Cty. Comm’rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 685 (1996) (applying
the same test to the termination of an independent contract as would be applied
in an employment case that involves an unconstitutional condition).
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contractors who do not have existing relationships with the
government, such as those bidding for a contract, and the circuit
courts are split on the issue.332 However, in the context of the
current regulations on foster homes, the test should be applied
equally to new foster parents as well as those with longstanding
relationships, similar to the extension to employees in the hiring
context.333 First, the main concern of the Court in extending
employee protection to independent contractors is the reduced
control.334 Through its regulations and routine checks of the foster
home, the state still maintains a significant amount of control over
foster parents.335 Also, the danger the state is trying to mitigate
arrives once the foster child is in the home,336 so it makes no sense
to differentiate between people applying and those who have an
existing relationship with the state. If the state is able to place a
restriction on firearms storage when approving a foster license, to
have the existence of the relationship allow the foster parent to
disregard the restrictions once the child is in the home would
defeat the purpose of the regulations. Therefore, the test below for
unconstitutional conditions should be applied equally to
prospective and existing foster parents, whether considered
employees or independent contractors. Because the Second
Amendment right has been analogized to the First Amendment,337
the same test should be applied to burdens placed on each right.
In analyzing conflicts that arise when employees and
independent contractors face conditions that restrict First
332. See Oscar Renda Contracting, Inc. v. City of Lubbock, 463 F.3d 378, 386
(5th Cir. 2006) (extending Umbehr to government contractors without an existing
relationship with the government). But see McClintock v. Eichelberger, 169 F.3d
812, 817 (3rd Cir. 1999) (limiting Umbehr to existing relationships).
333. See Rutan, 497 U.S. at 79 (applying First Amendment protection in the
context of employee hiring).
334. See Umbehr, 518 U.S. at 676–77 (discussing how independent
contractors are greater removed from government control than employees).
335. See, e.g., MICH. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., LICENSING RULES FOR
FOSTER FAMILY HOMES AND FOSTER FAMILY GROUP HOMES FOR CHILDREN (2015),
https://www.michigan.gov/documents/mdhhs/CWL-PUB-10_502652_7.pdf
(setting out the requirements for the licensing of foster homes in Michigan).
336. See supra Part II.B (setting out the justification for regulating firearm
storage in foster homes).
337. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595 (2008) (comparing
the Second Amendment right to the individual rights protected by the First
Amendment).
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Amendment rights, the Court applies the test developed in
Pickering v. Board of Education.338 This test requires balancing the
“interests of the [employee], as a citizen . . . and the interest of the
State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the public
services it performs through its employees.”339 The interest in
Pickering of commenting on matters of public concern was
recognized as a core value of the First Amendment’s Free Speech
Clause.340 Similarly, the interest in keeping an operational firearm
in the home for the purpose of self-defense is a core value of the
Second Amendment.341 As for the state’s interest in promoting the
efficiency of the foster system, while they must regulate the foster
parents due to a lack of direct control over day to day operations,
there is no evidence to suggest that foster homes would not be
equally as efficient under less restrictive firearm requirements.
Some states use less restrictive alternatives,342 and nothing
suggests that their systems are unable to achieve the state’s
goals.343 To require measures as restrictive as Michigan’s is
impermissible based on this analysis, as it restricts the interest of
the foster parent beyond what is necessary. Because this test has
not been applied directly to foster care regulations, some of the
other restrictions that raise constitutional questions are reviewed
to see if an analogy suggests that the Second Amendment may be
restricted outside of the Pickering analysis.
First, the Ninth Circuit concluded that foster parents did not
have a constitutionally protected free exercise right to use corporal
punishment on their foster child.344 In response to the religious
338. 391 U.S. 563 (1968); see also Umbehr, 518 U.S. at 676–79 (discussing the
application of the Pickering test to employees and independent contractors).
339. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.
340. See id. at 573 (recognizing debate on matters of public concern as the
“core value” of free speech).
341. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 630 (describing the “core lawful purpose of
self-defense” under the Second Amendment).
342. See, e.g., HAW. CODE R. § 17-1625-22 (LexisNexis 2018) (requiring that
the foster home be generally equipped with protection from firearms).
343. See infra notes 425–426 and accompanying text (discussing the very
limited research on the dangers posed to foster children).
344. See Backlund v. Barnhart, 778 F.2d 1386, 1389 (9th Cir. 1985) (“[T]he
Backlunds must show that they, as foster parents, had a clearly established right
to exercise their religious beliefs about punishment on a foster care child. They
fail to cite any pertinent authority . . . . Nor can they . . . .”).
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defense of corporal punishment, the court noted that “even natural
parents have no clearly established right to unlimited exercise of
religious beliefs on their children.”345 There was no authority to
show that foster parents were singled out from the general
population.346
In contrast, the Second Amendment protects the general
population from interference with the right of responsible and
law-abiding citizens to protect themselves in the home.347 Foster
parents fit within this definition, and the regulations single them
out for exclusion from Second Amendment protection. The Ninth
Circuit simply determined that the relationship between the foster
parent and foster child “confer[red] no new constitutional
rights.”348 The constitutional right to keep arms already exists.349
Additionally, other courts have recognized that the foster children
and their biological parents have a free exercise interest that must
be reasonably accommodated in the foster home.350 This means
that the foster parent’s extension of religious beliefs onto their
foster child could potentially conflict with the constitutional rights
of others. In contrast, the exercise of Second Amendment rights in
the foster home does not conflict with the rights of parents or the
child. These situations are not analogous.
Additionally, foster parents often lose their ability to protect
themselves from searches of their home by the department
responsible for the child.351 However, the Fourth Amendment
comparison also fails to justify the restrictions on firearms. The
Fourth Amendment does not protect from searches in general. It
345. Id.
346. See id. (determining that the Backlunds failed to cite any pertinent
authority showing that a cognizable right had been infringed because that right
is not even established for natural parents).
347. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 635 (concluding that the Second Amendment
protects the right for responsible citizens to possess firearms for the purpose of
self-defense in the home).
348. Backlund, 778 F.2d at 1390.
349. See U.S. CONST. amend. II (preserving the right to “keep and bear arms”).
350. See Wilder v. Bernstein, 848 F.2d 1338, 1347 (2d Cir. 1988) (concluding
that the state must make reasonable efforts to assure the foster child’s religious
needs are met while the state is responsible).
351. See Wildauer v. Frederick Cty., 993 F.2d 369, 373 (4th Cir. 1993)
(determining that the state’s interest in examining a foster child who may have
been neglected outweighs Wildauer’s privacy interest).
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protects the people from searches deemed “unreasonable.”352 In
cases involving foster parents, courts have either applied the
“special needs” exception to the Fourth Amendment,353 or have
decided the matter on general principles of qualified immunity.354
Instead, administrative searches of homes in which foster children
reside may simply be deemed reasonable based on the
circumstances.355 This is a fact specific inquiry that the language
of the Amendment explicitly calls for with the word
“unreasonable.”356 Similar laws have been upheld in other
situations, such as periodic home visits to ensure eligibility as a
condition on the receipt of welfare benefits.357 The Supreme Court
determined that such searches by caseworkers were reasonable
based on the public interest and the difference between these
searches and traditional searches.358 Also, the home is only opened
up to a limited number of officials for specific administrative
checks359 or for investigative home visits that apply in contexts
outside of foster homes.360
352. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures,
shall not be violated . . . .” (emphasis added)).
353. See Wildauer, 993 F.2d at 372 (“In determining whether a search and
seizure is reasonable, we must balance the government’s need to search with the
invasion endured by the plaintiff.”); see also Doriane L. Coleman, Storming the
Castle to Save the Children: The Ironic Costs of a Child Welfare Exception to the
Fourth Amendment, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 413, 417 n.6 (2005) (stating that the
“special needs doctrine” applies in civil cases, and the constitutionality of searches
and seizures is determined by “reasonableness balancing analysis”).
354. See Wildauer, 993 F.2d at 372 (granting the defendants qualified
immunity because “they did ‘not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have known’” (quoting
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982))).
355. See id. at 372–73 (determining that multiple searches of the plaintiff’s
home by a social worker accompanied by police officers and nurses were
“reasonable” based on the circumstances of each).
356. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
357. See Wyman v. James, 400 U.S. 309, 326 (1971) (determining the searches
were a “reasonable administrative tool”).
358. See id. at 318–24 (determining that if the searches were those considered
by the Fourth Amendment they would not be unreasonable).
359. See, e.g., ILL. ADM. CODE tit. 89 § 402.27 (2018) (requiring at least
semiannual visits to licensed facilities to ensure continued compliance).
360. See Wildauer, 993 F.2d at 372 (“[I]nvestigative home visits by social
workers are not subject to the same scrutiny as searches in the criminal context.”);
see also Wyman, 400 U.S. at 318 (determining that a New York law conditioning
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The Second Amendment, on the other hand, does not qualify
the restriction it places on the government. It simply states that
the people’s right “shall not be infringed.”361 This is bolstered by
Heller rejecting a fact specific inquiry,362 meaning that the storage
restrictions cannot be justified without a waiver of the Second
Amendment. Because the restrictions on firearms apply in the
foster home at all times, they are a full denial of the right, not just
a partial burden, which goes well beyond the scope of the Fourth
Amendment issue that arises from occasional home inspections by
agency officials. These Fourth Amendment issues are not
analogous and cannot justify the regulations in question.
Because foster parents cannot be removed from the protection
of the Second Amendment for any of the above reasons, the
regulations in question fall within the scope of the right.363
Therefore, part two of the test must be conducted to determine if
the regulations pass constitutional muster.364
C. Part 2: Determining the Proper Level of Scrutiny
As stated above, the circuit courts have employed a two-step
inquiry based on the Supreme Court’s First Amendment analysis
used to determine the constitutionality of restrictions burdening
Second Amendment rights.365 The second step in the test involves
its own set of two questions.366 First, it must be determined how
close the burden comes to the core of the Second Amendment
the receipt of welfare benefits on a social worker’s home visit was not
unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment).
361. U.S. CONST. amend. II.
362. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 634–35 (2008) (rejecting
the notion that future courts should weigh the interests in each case involving the
Second Amendment).
363. See Jackson v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 746 F.3d 953, 960 (9th Cir.
2014) (stating that regulations either fall within the scope of the right or within
categories that are unprotected).
364. See id. (“If a prohibition falls within the historical scope of the Second
Amendment, we must then proceed to the second step of the Second Amendment
inquiry . . . .”).
365. See id. (describing the two-step inquiry used by the majority of circuits,
which “bears strong analogies to the Supreme Court’s free-speech caselaw”).
366. See id. at 960–61 (setting out the two-step process for “ascertaining the
appropriate level of scrutiny”).
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right.367 The majority of circuits have recognized the core purpose
of the right as self-defense within the home.368 Second, the severity
of the burden placed on that right by the regulation is analyzed.369
A law that imposes a severe restriction on the core of the Second
Amendment right will be “unconstitutional under any level of
scrutiny.”370 If the core of the right is not burdened, or that burden
is not severe, then intermediate scrutiny is the proper test.371
1. Does the Regulation Burden the Core of the Second
Amendment Right?
There are two restrictions similar to the ones analyzed in this
Note that have been tested against the core of the Second
Amendment—the right to possess a firearm for self-defense in the
home.372 The most analogous is the D.C. restriction struck down in
Heller, which required all lawfully owned firearms to be equipped
with a trigger lock or rendered inoperable.373 The other is the San
Francisco ordinance in question in Jackson, which requires all
handguns to be stored in a locked container or with a trigger lock
unless carried by a person.374 While each of these is less restrictive
367. See id. (describing the first step as an analysis of “the extent to which
the law burdens the core of the Second Amendment right”).
368. See supra notes 225–231 and accompanying text (recognizing multiple
circuits that have recognized the core of the Second Amendment right to be
self-defense in the home).
369. See Jackson, 746 F.3d at 961–62 (noting that the second question is the
severity of the burden placed on the right).
370. Id. at 961.
371. See id. (“[I]f a challenged law does not implicate a core Second
Amendment right, or does not place a substantial burden on the Second
Amendment right, [the court] may apply intermediate scrutiny.”).
372. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 630 (referring to the “core lawful purpose of
self-defense”); see also supra notes 225–231 and accompanying text (recognizing
multiple circuits that have determined the core of the Second Amendment right
to be self-defense in the home).
373. Compare District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 575 (2008)
(“District of Columbia law also requires residents to keep their lawfully owned
firearms, such as registered long guns, unloaded and dissembled or bound by a
trigger lock or similar device . . . .” (internal quotations omitted)), with MICH.
ADMIN. CODE r. 400.9415(3) (2018) (requiring firearms be kept in locked storage
or trigger locked, with ammunition locked in separate storage).
374. See Jackson v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 746 F.3d 953, 958 (9th Cir.
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than the foster care restrictions, each was still determined to
burden the core of the Second Amendment by rendering firearms
inoperable for the purpose of self-defense.375 Following these cases,
there is no doubt that requiring foster parents to keep all firearms
in the home locked in a container places a burden on the core of the
Second Amendment. Because of this, the second prong must be
analyzed. However, the answer to the second prong is not so easily
determined based on these cases.
2. How Severe is the Law’s Burden on the Right?
Heller and Jackson remain the best analogies to the
regulations on foster parents when determining the proper level of
scrutiny to apply.376 While Heller did not apply this exact test, the
Court determined that the D.C. requirement was unconstitutional
because it made it “impossible for citizens to use them for the core
lawful purpose of self-defense.”377 Impossibility is a severe burden
on the right. On the other hand, Jackson determined that the San
Francisco ordinance was not a severe burden, and applied
intermediate scrutiny.378 Each of these restrictions will be
analyzed to determine which is a better comparison to the one in
question here.
The D.C. statute analyzed in Heller has a couple of important
characteristics related to the current analysis. First, the
requirement that firearms be bound by a trigger lock or be kept
unloaded or disassembled applied to all lawfully owned
firearms.379 Second, the restriction contained no exception for a
2014) (stating the requirements of San Francisco Police Code Section 4512).
375. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 630 (concluding that a requirement that lawfully
owned firearms in the home be rendered inoperable “makes it impossible for
citizens to use them for the core lawful purpose of self-defense and is hence
unconstitutional”); Jackson, 746 F.3d at 964 (“Section 4512 therefore burdens the
core of the Second Amendment right.”).
376. See supra notes 373–374 and accompanying text (comparing the
Michigan regulation regarding foster parents to the restrictions analyzed in
Heller and Jackson).
377. Heller, 554 U.S. at 630.
378. See Jackson, 746 F.3d at 965 (“[B]ecause [the ordinance] does not impose
a substantial burden on conduct protected by the Second Amendment, we apply
intermediate scrutiny.”).
379. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 575 (discussing the requirement that District of
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weapon that was carried on the person.380 Finally, while the
statute contained exceptions for firearms “located in a place of
business” and firearms “being used for lawful recreational
activities,”381 the Court determined that the statute could not be
read to contain an exception for self-defense.382
The San Francisco ordinance analyzed in Jackson differed
significantly on these points. First, the ordinance applied only to
handguns and not all lawfully owned firearms.383 Second, the law
contained an explicit exception for firearms “carried on the person
of an individual over the age of 18.”384
With the exception of South Carolina385 and the states without
explicit requirements for firearm storage in foster homes, the
regulations in question are significantly more analogous to the
D.C. law. First, the regulations each apply to all firearms, and not
just a specific subset.386 Second, the least restrictive regulations,
which just require the firearms to be locked, contain no exception
for recreational purposes or self-defense.387 This makes the
requirements at least as restrictive as those in Heller, if not more
so. As each additional requirement is added on in the different
Columbia residents “keep their lawfully owned firearms” bound by a trigger lock
or rendered inoperable).
380. See id. (describing the statute and mentioning no exception related to
firearms carried on the owner).
381. Id.
382. See id. at 630 (concluding that a self-defense exception is “precluded by
the unequivocal text, and by the presence of certain other enumerated
exceptions”).
383. See Jackson, 746 F.3d at 958 (stating that San Francisco Police Code
Section 4512 provided that “handguns” in a residence must be bound by a trigger
lock or kept in a locked container).
384. Id. (internal citation and quotation marks omitted).
385. South Carolina’s regulation contains an explicit exception for firearms
carried by the foster parent. S.C. CODE ANN. REGS. 114-550(H)(18) (2018). This
Note does not draw any conclusions on the constitutionality of storage
requirements with this additional exception.
386. See, e.g., ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 7 § 10.1080(b) (2018) (requiring foster
parents “ensure that any firearms are unloaded and stored in a locked gun safe
or other locked place” (emphasis added)); 10A N.C. ADMIN. CODE 70E.1110(g)
(2018) (“Explosive materials, ammunition, and firearms shall each be stored
separately, in locked places.” (emphasis added)).
387. See, e.g., W. VA. CODE R. § 78-2-15.6 (2018) (“An agency shall ensure that
weapons, related attachments and ammunition are stored in a locked container
inaccessible to children.”).
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states, the burden becomes significantly more severe than in
Heller. Jackson presents one argument relevant to the restrictions
at hand, claiming that a modern gun safe can be opened quickly.388
However, Heller makes no mention of the speed at which trigger
locks could be removed in its consideration of the restriction just
ten years ago.389 Additionally, Jackson relies on the ability of San
Francisco’s citizens to use alternative channels by carrying the
handgun on their person.390 San Francisco would also allow for the
use of lawfully owned firearms other than handguns to be used.391
No such alternative channels exist in the regulations in question.
There is no doubt that the regulations on foster parents
analyzed here place a severe burden on the core of the Second
Amendment.
3. Rejecting the Case for Intermediate Scrutiny
The Western District of Michigan determined that
intermediate scrutiny is the proper measure to apply to
regulations like the Michigan safe-storage measure.392 However,
the court’s reasoning is flawed for four reasons. First, it relies
heavily on the Sixth Circuit’s conclusion in Tyler v. Hillsdale
County Sheriff’s Department393 that firearm bans concerning the
mentally ill are subject to intermediate scrutiny.394 The Western
District of Michigan relied on this case because the “Sixth Circuit
has never applied strict scrutiny to a Second Amendment
388. See Jackson v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 746 F.3d 953, 964 (9th Cir.
2014) (“The record indicates that a modern gun safe may be opened quickly.”).
389. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 630 (2008) (addressing
the trigger lock requirement but making no mention of the ease or hardship of
removing the lock).
390. See Jackson, 746 F.3d at 964 (discussing the alternative channels
allowing for self-defense in the home).
391. See id. at 958 (noting that the restriction only applies to handguns).
392. See opinion at 23, Johnson v. Lyon, No. 2:17-cv-00124 (W.D. Mich. Aug.
14, 2018) [hereinafter Opinion] (“[I]ntermediate scrutiny is the appropriate
standard despite the Plaintiffs’ strong argument for the application of strict
scrutiny.”).
393. 837 F.3d 678 (6th Cir. 2016) (en banc).
394. See id. at 21-22 (citing Tyler v. Hillsdale Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 837 F.3d
678 (6th Cir. 2016) (en banc)) (“The most relevant discussion of the choice of
scrutiny from the Sixth Circuit comes from the court’s en banc opinion in Tyler.”).
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challenge” under the two-step framework.395 However, Firearm
regulations pertaining to the mentally ill are specifically noted in
Heller as potential exclusions under the Second Amendment.396 In
the end, the Sixth Circuit did not exclude the mentally ill from the
Second Amendment. Instead, it reasoned, based on Heller, that the
mentally ill are not at the core of the Second Amendment in the
second step of the two-step framework.397 The court’s reasoning
also focused on the mentally ill as being “presumptively
dangerous.”398 Nothing suggests that foster parents would be
treated similarly. The Western District of Michigan relies on a
dangerous false equivalency by adopting the Tyler rationale to
analyze the Michigan regulation.
Second, in deciding that intermediate scrutiny should apply,
the district court focuses on foster parents as “a narrow class of
citizens who volunteer to assume the burdens and benefits of
serving as foster parents.”399 The voluntary aspect of this
reasoning has already been analyzed.400 As for the narrow class,
the Second Amendment is an individual right of each person.401
Never has a court suggested, in deciding the appropriate standard
to apply to a regulation affecting an individual right, that lower
levels of scrutiny apply when the affected group is smaller.
Consequently, a burden on a single individual is still an absolute
burden on the Second Amendment because what is at issue is an
individual right. Tyler makes reference to a “narrow class of
individuals.”402 However, the reference does not focus solely on the
size, but rather returns to the court’s reasoning that the class at
issue—the mentally ill—is “not at the core of the Second
395. Id. at 22.
396. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 626 (suggesting certain “longstanding
prohibitions” may still be appropriate following the opinion).
397. See Tyler v. Hillsdale Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 837 F.3d 678, 691 (6th Cir.
2016) (en banc) (“Reviewing § 922(g)(4) under strict scrutiny would invert Heller’s
presumption that prohibitions on the mentally ill are lawful.”).
398. Id. at 691.
399. Opinion, supra note 392, at 23.
400. Supra Part V.A.4.
401. See District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 595 (2008) (concluding
that the Second Amendment confers an individual right based on “both text and
history”).
402. Tyler, 837 F.3d at 691.
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Amendment.”403 The district court is wrong in relying on the size
and voluntary nature of the class.
Third, the district court relies on Tyler to suggest that
intermediate scrutiny should apply to afford state agencies
“‘considerable flexibility’ in regulating health and safety
concerns.”404 Yet, Tyler does not support this proposition. Tyler
mentions “[Congress’] considerable flexibility to regulate gun
safety.”405 But, Tyler does not make mention of health and safety,
nor does it reference the benefit of flexibility as a reason to choose
intermediate scrutiny.406 The court simply notes that intermediate
scrutiny is beneficial because it allows flexibility while still
requiring the government to justify its regulations.407 The court
concluded that intermediate scrutiny is appropriate because the
restriction “does not burden the core of the Second Amendment”
but does “place a substantial burden on conduct and persons
protected by the Second Amendment.”408
The district court cannot rely solely on this analysis because
the Michigan regulation burdens the core of the Second
Amendment and places a substantial burden on protected
conduct409—the only two questions in the second step of the test
applied under the two-step test.410 Additionally, the government’s
interest in protecting health and safety is already analyzed under
the test set out by each level of scrutiny.411 If the interest in
403. Id. It would be absurd to allow regulations that burden individual rights
to garner a lower level of scrutiny simply because the burden is placed on one
individual at a time rather than the entire population.
404. Opinion, supra note 392, at 23 (quoting Tyler, 837 F.3d at 692).
405. Tyler, 837 F.3d at 692 (alteration in original) (quoting Bonidy v. U.S.
Postal Serv., 790 F.3d 1121, 1126 (10th Cir. 2015)).
406. See id. (noting the benefits of the intermediate scrutiny approach the
court had already chosen).
407. See id. (noting why intermediate scrutiny is “preferable in evaluating
challenges to § 922(g)(4)”).
408. Id.
409. See supra Parts V.C.1; V.C.2 (concluding that the Michigan regulation
meets both requirements for strict scrutiny).
410. See Tyler v. Hillsdale Cty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 837 F.3d 678, 690 (6th Cir.
2016) (en banc) (setting out the proper test to determine the appropriate level of
scrutiny).
411. See id. at 693 (stating that intermediate scrutiny requires the government
to state an objective that is “significant, substantial, or important”); United States
v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000) (stating that strict scrutiny
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regulating safety and health is compelling, it will be considered
during the scrutiny analysis. Suggesting that the government’s
interest in regulating health and safety and its “need” for
flexibility should help determine the level of scrutiny would
essentially allow any compelling interest to be afforded
intermediate scrutiny. This would render strict scrutiny pointless.
Therefore, the Western District of Michigan was wrong to consider
factors other than the core of the Second Amendment and the
severity of the burden in determining the level of scrutiny.
Finally, the district court made reference to Jackson as the
“most factually-analogous ‘safe storage’ ordinance” and noted that
“the Ninth Circuit applied intermediate scrutiny.”412 However, the
Ninth Circuit’s reasoning failed to show how Jackson is factually
analogous. The Ninth Circuit determined that the San Francisco
ordinances did not “impose the sort of severe burden that requires
the higher level of scrutiny.”413 That was because the San
Francisco safe storage ordinance was only applicable to
handguns.414 Also, “section 4512 le[ft] open alternative channels
for self-defense in the home, because San Franciscans [we]re not
required to secure their handguns while carrying them on their
person.”415 In contrast, the Michigan regulation does not provide
either of these exceptions.416 Therefore, the district court was
wrong to suggest that Jackson was sufficiently analogous to guide
its reasoning.
Based on these issues with the district court’s analysis, it is
still appropriate to reject intermediate scrutiny and suggest that
the regulation meets the requirements of the test’s second prong.417
This should end the issue here because such restrictions are
requires a “compelling Government interest”).
412. Opinion, supra note 392, at 23 (citing Jackson v. City & Cty. of San
Francisco, 746 F.3d 953, 959, 966 (9th Cir. 2014)).
413. Jackson v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 746 F.3d 953, 964 (9th Cir.
2014).
414. See id. at 958 (discussing the relevant code section restricting handgun
storage in homes).
415. Id. at 964.
416. See MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 400.9415(3) (2018) (requiring locked storage of
all firearms in a foster home).
417. See supra Parts V.C.1; V.C.2 (concluding that the Michigan regulation
places a severe burden on the core of the Second Amendment).
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“unconstitutional under any level of scrutiny.”418 However, rather
than automatically declaring them invalid, some circuits have
decided to apply strict scrutiny to regulations that severely burden
the core of the Second Amendment.419 Also, the courts apply strict
scrutiny to regulations that severely restrict speech and due
process rights.420 Therefore, the following subpart applies strict
scrutiny to the regulation to account for the possibility that a court
will do so when analyzing the foster home regulations.
D. Applying Strict Scrutiny
Strict scrutiny requires that a law be “narrowly tailored to
promote a compelling Government interest.”421 Also, “[i]f a less
restrictive alternative would serve the Government’s purpose, the
legislature must use that alternative.”422 There seems to be a
compelling interest of the state to protect the children for whom it
is responsible from the dangers of firearms in the home.423 Also,
the state has at least some duty to protect the child from a
dangerous foster home.424 Some sources suggest that suicide rates
are higher among foster children than the normal population.425
418. Jackson, 746 F.3d at 961.
419. See United States v. Chester, 628 F.3d 673, 682 (4th Cir. 2010) (“Our
task, therefore, is to select between strict scrutiny and intermediate scrutiny.”).
420. See Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Strict Judicial Scrutiny, 54 UCLA L. Rev.
1267, 1269 (2007) (stating that strict scrutiny is “the baseline rule” for analyzing
content based restrictions on speech, as well as being applied in due process cases
restricting fundamental rights (internal citation and quotation marks omitted)).
421. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. at 813.
422. Id.
423. See supra Part II.B (describing the dangers firearms pose to children in
the United States).
424. See Doe ex rel. Johnson v. S.C. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 597 F.3d 163, 176 (4th
Cir. 2010) (determining that the state had a duty to refrain from placing a foster
child in a known dangerous environment).
425. See NAT’L CTR. FOR THE PREVENTION OF YOUTH SUICIDE, PREVENTING
SUICIDAL BEHAVIOR AMONG YOUTH IN FOSTER CARE
1
(2016),
http://www.mhawisconsin.org/Data/Sites/1/media/impact-of-suicide-2016/out-offolder-4—preventing-suicidal-behavior-among-youth-in-foster-care-(foster-parent).pdf
(“Studies have found that youth involved in child welfare or juvenile justice were
3 to 5 times more likely to die by suicide than youth in the general population.”);
Daniel J. Pilowsky & Li-Tzy Wu, Psychiatric Symptoms and Substance Use
Disorders in a Nationally Representative Sample of American Adolescents
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However, this evidence does not clearly establish that risk of
suicide and unintentional firearm injuries are higher in foster
homes.426 Also, Heller specifically notes that while handgun
violence is an issue, “the enshrinement of constitutional rights
necessarily takes certain policy choices off the table.”427 Whether
the interest is compelling may be a fact-specific determination
made in each case. Assuming the state’s interest is compelling, the
restriction must be narrowly tailored as well.428
The restrictions in question are not narrowly tailored. As
discussed above, the interest Michigan claims in regulating
storage in the foster home is to protect foster children from
accidents and suicides.429 The law is overly restrictive in that it
attempts to achieve the goal of protecting children by also
restricting everyone else in the foster home from accessing
firearms. There is no interest cited to suggest that foster parents
pose a specific danger to the foster child when they can access
firearms for self-defense, so restricting them as well goes beyond
the scope of the compelling interest of the state. Also, the
government must choose any less restrictive means of achieving
the same goal.430 An exhaustive search has uncovered no evidence
that restrictions allowing for foster parents to carry firearms on
their person are any less successful than the restrictions in
question. Similarly, regulations that punish foster parents who
store firearms in a location accessible to the foster children may be
similarly as successful without specifically dictating where storage
Involved with Foster Care, 38 J. ADOLESCENT HEALTH 351, 356 (2006) (determining
that children living away from both parents are at an increased risk of suicide
attempts, whether caused by the separation or some other factor in the
relationship prior to separation).
426. The National Center for the Prevention of Youth Suicide relies on a study
from Quebec. See NAT’L CTR. FOR THE PREVENTION OF YOUTH SUICIDE, supra note
425, at 5. Also, the study cited says there may be a correlation between foster
children and higher suicide risk, but does not claim any determinative findings.
See Daniel J. Pilowsky & Li-Tzy Wu, supra note 425, at 351.
427. District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570, 636 (2008).
428. See United States v. Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. 803, 813 (2000)
(setting out the proper test for a strict scrutiny analysis).
429. See supra Part II.B (setting out the interests posed in support of the
Michigan regulations).
430. See Playboy Entm’t Grp., Inc., 529 U.S. at 813 (“If a less restrictive
alternative would serve the Government’s purpose, the legislature must use that
alternative.”).

1698

75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1639 (2018)

must occur. This would be easier to monitor than in a normal home
due to the increased access of the state into foster homes to ensure
compliance with regulations.431 While this Note draws no
conclusions on the constitutionality of these restrictions, it also
finds no evidence that states without the severe requirements on
storage are any less successful in preventing harm to foster
children than those with the increased burden. Therefore, the
states that require locked storage of all firearms in foster homes,
regardless of additional restrictions on ammunition, fail to
overcome the heavy burden of strict scrutiny.
VI. Conclusion
Regulations on firearms in foster homes are commonplace in
the United States. Forty-four states and the District of Columbia
require foster parents to store firearms in the home in locked
cabinets or disable firearms with a trigger lock.432 Thirty-eight of
those states and the District of Columbia add additional
requirements on top of those restrictions.433 This Note does not
comment on whether these are common sense regulations from a
policy standpoint. When a right is enumerated in the Constitution,
common sense is no longer the threshold for achieving state goals.
State regulation of firearm storage in foster homes places a burden
on an enumerated right and, therefore, must comply with the
Second Amendment and District of Columbia v. Heller. Heller
made clear that the Second Amendment protects the right of
law-abiding individuals to possess operable, legally owned
firearms in the home for use in self-defense.434 In analyzing the
state regulations against this right, foster parents as a class may
not be excluded from Second Amendment protection. Additionally,
the regulations in question are either unconstitutional under any
431. See, e.g., MICH. ADMIN. CODE r. 400.9415(3) (2018) (requiring foster
parents to allow MDHHS access to the home for licensing and foster care
purposes).
432. Infra Figure 1.
433. See infra Figure 1 (recognizing other restrictions states place on foster
parents).
434. See Heller, 554 U.S. at 635 (holding that bans on handgun possession
and rendering lawful firearms operable for self-defense in the home are
unconstitutional).
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level of scrutiny, or must be subject to strict scrutiny. Under either
test, regulations that require all firearms in the foster home to be
stored in a locked safe or disabled by a trigger lock, as well as those
which place additional restrictions on the storage of ammunition,
are unconstitutional.
The forty-four states that regulate in this fashion have a
strong interest in protecting foster children, but they must find an
alternative way to achieve their goal. The Author does not
recommend the best method to do so without overstepping the
limits of the Second Amendment. However, the states have chosen
the most restrictive way possible up to this point, and they surely
can find less restrictive alternatives for the future. The Attorney
General of Michigan put it best: “Given that we trust [certain]
individuals with the great responsibility of caring for [the state’s
most vulnerable] children, it makes sense that we would also trust
them to do what we trust every other law-abiding citizen to do:
exercise responsible gun ownership.”435

435. Amicus Curiae Brief of Attorney General Bill Schuette in Support of
Plaintiffs at 1, Johnson v. Lyon, No. 2:17-cv-00124 (W.D. Mich. Nov. 29, 2017).
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Figure 1

States

Requires
firearms
in foster
homes to
be kept
in locked
storage
and/or
trigger
locked

Requires
ammunition
in firearms
to be stored
in separate
location; and
if that
location
must be
locked

Requires
firearms
in foster
homes to
be trigger
locked
AND
locked in
a safe

Citation to State Regulation
specifically addressing storage
or handling of firearms in
foster homes

Alabama

Yes

Yes (Locked)

No

Alaska

Yes

Yes

No

Arizona

Yes

Yes (Locked)

Yes

Arkansas

Yes

Yes (Locked)

No

California

Yes

Yes (Locked)

No

Colorado

Yes

Yes (Locked)

No

Connecticut

Yes

Yes (Locked)

Delaware

Yes

Yes (Locked)

Yes (when
possible)
No

District of
Columbia
Florida

Yes

Yes (Locked)

Yes

Yes

Yes (Locked)

No

ALA. ADMIN. CODE r. 660-5-29.03(3)(g–h) (2018).
ALASKA ADMIN. CODE tit. 7
§ 10.1080(b) (2018).
ARIZ. ADMIN. CODE
§ R21-8-106 (2018).
016.15.2 ARK. CODE R. § 208
(LexisNexis 2018).
CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 22,
§ 89387.2 (2018).
12 COLO. CODE REGS. § 25098:7.708.22(B)(2) (2018).
CONN. AGENCIES REGS. § 17a145-141 (2018).
9 DEL. ADMIN. CODE
201-40.1.18 (2018).
D.C. MUN. REGS. tit. 29,
§ 6007.9 (2018).
FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r.
65G-2.007(12)(c) (2018).

Georgia

Yes

No

No

Hawaii

No

No

No

Idaho

Yes

No

No

Illinois

Yes

Yes

Yes

Indiana

Yes

Yes (Locked)

No

GA. COMP. R. & REGS.
290-9-2-.07(5)(a)(9)(ii)(IX)
(2018).
HAW. CODE R. § 17-1625-22
(LexisNexis 2018).
IDAHO ADMIN. CODE r.
16.06.02.435 (2018)
ILL. ADM. CODE tit. 89 § 402.8
(2018); ILL. DEP’T CHILDREN &
FAMILY SERVS., POL’Y GUIDE
2015.08, ENHANCED FIREARM
SAFETY IN FOSTER FAMILY
HOMES (2015).
465 IND. ADMIN. CODE 2-1.510(c) (West 2018).
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Iowa

Yes

Yes (Locked)

No

Kansas

Yes

Yes (Locked)

No

Kentucky

No

No

No

Louisiana

Yes

Yes (Locked)

No

Maine

Yes

Yes (Locked)

No

Maryland

Yes

No

No

Massachusetts

Yes

Yes (Locked)

Yes

Michigan

Yes

Yes (Locked)

No

Minnesota

Yes

Yes

No

Mississippi

No

No

No

Missouri

Yes

Yes (Locked)

No

Montana

Yes

Yes (Locked)

No

Nebraska

Yes

Yes (Locked)

No

Nevada

Yes

Yes (Locked)

No

New
Hampshire
New Jersey

Yes

Yes (Locked)

No

Yes

Yes (Locked)

No

New Mexico

Yes

Yes

No

New York

No

No

No

North
Carolina
North Dakota

Yes

Yes (Locked)

No

Yes

Yes

No

Ohio

Yes

Yes (Locked)

No

Oklahoma

Yes

No

No

Oregon

No

No

No

Pennsylvania

No

No

No

Rhode Island

Yes

Yes (Locked)

No

1701

IOWA ADMIN. CODE r.
441-113.7(237) (2018).
KAN. ADMIN. REGS. § 28-4-820
(2018).
922 KY. ADMIN. REGS. 1:350
(2018).
LA. ADMIN CODE. tit. 67,
§ 7313 (2018).
10-148-016 ME. CODE R.
§ 9(E)(7) (LexisNexis 2018).
MD. CODE REGS.
07.05.02.10(G)(1) (2018).
110 MASS. CODE REGS.
7.105(16) (2018).
MICH. ADMIN. CODE r.
400.9415(3) (2018)
MINN. DEP’T OF HUM. SERVS.,
DHS 0644, CHILD FOSTER
CARE HOME SAFETY
CHECKLIST (2017).
18-6:1 MISS. ADMIN. CODE.
§ F-II (2018).
MO. CODE REGS. ANN. tit. 13,
§ 35-60.040 (2018).
MONT. ADMIN. R.
37.51.901(13) (2018).
395 NEB. ADMIN. CODE
§ 3-001.17D (2018).
NEV. ADMIN. CODE § 424.600
(2018).
N.H. CODE ADMIN. R. He-C
6446.10 (2018).
N.J. ADMIN. CODE § 3A:51-6.9
(2018).
N.M. CODE R. § 8.26.4.13(L)(7)
(LexisNexis 2018).
N.Y. COMP. CODES R. & REGS.
tit. 18, § 443.3 (2018).
10A N.C. ADMIN. CODE
70E.1110 (2018).
N.D. ADMIN. CODE 75-03-14-03
(2018).
OHIO ADMIN. CODE 5101:2-712(F) (2018).
OKLA. ADMIN. CODE § 340:1105-60(b)(3) (2018).
OR. ADMIN. R. 413-215-0318
(2018).
None Specific to Firearms
214-40 R.I. CODE R. § 3.7.2(E)
(LexisNexis 2018).

1702
South
Carolina

75 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1639 (2018)
No

No

S.C. CODE ANN. REGS.
114-550(H)(18) (2018).

South Dakota

Yes
(unless
being
carried)
Yes

Yes

No

Tennessee

Yes

Yes

Yes

Texas

Yes

Yes (Locked)

No

Utah

Yes

Yes (Locked)

No

Vermont

Yes

Yes (Locked)

No

S.D. ADMIN. R. 67:42:05:20
(2018).
TENN. DEP’T OF CHILD. SERVS.,
ADMIN. POL’S & PROCS.: 16.4,
FOSTER HOME SELECTION AND
APPROVAL G(7)(b) (2018).
26 TEX. ADMIN. CODE
§ 749.2961 (2018).
UTAH ADMIN. CODE r. 501-127(6) (2018).
13-7 VT. ADMIN. CODE R.
§ 40.407 (2018).

Virginia

Yes

Yes (Locked)

No

Washington

Yes

No

West Virginia

Yes

Yes (unless
in safe made
for firearms)
No

No

Wisconsin

Yes

Yes (Locked)

No

Wyoming

Yes

Yes (Locked)

No

22 VA. ADMIN. CODE § 40-21170(J)(2) (2018).
WASH. ADMIN. CODE
§ 110-148-1500 (2018).
W. VA. CODE R. § 78-2-15.6
(2018).
WIS. ADMIN. CODE DCF
§ 56.08(5) (2018).
049-0029-3 WYO. CODE R.
§ 18(k) (LexisNexis 2018).

